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Strategies for Protecting Privacy in Open Data and
Proactive Disclosure
Teresa Scassa* and Amy Conroy**
Abstract
In this paper, the authors explore strategies for balancing privacy with transparency
in the release of government data and information as part of the growing global
open government movement. The issue is important because government data or
information may take many forms, may contain many different types of personal
information, and may be released in a range of contexts. The legal framework is
complex: personal information is typically not released as open data or under access
to information regimes; nevertheless, in some cases transparency requirements take
precedence over the protection of personal information. The open courts principle,
for example, places a strong emphasis on transparency over privacy. The situation
is complicated by the availability of technologies that facilitate widespread
dissemination of information and that allow for the searching, combining and
mining of information in ways that may permit the reidentification of individuals
even within anonymized data sets. This paper identifies a number of strategies
designed to assist in identifying whether government data sets or information
contain personal information, whether it should be released notwithstanding the
presence of the personal information, and what techniques might be used to
minimize any possible adverse privacy impacts.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years the municipal, 1 provincial,2 and federal3
governments of Canada have become increasingly involved in open
government initiatives. 4 In general, the open government movement is
1

2

3

4

Over thirty Canadian municipalities have adopted open data and open government
strategies: Datalibre.ca lists 44 cities with open data initiatives. Most are government-led
while several are citizen-led portals: Datalibre, online: Open Data and Open Governance
in Canada: A Critical Examination of New Opportunities and Old Tensions” (2014) 6:3
Future Internet 414 at 415. Recently, the City of Edmonton won an award at the Open
Data Summit. Discussing this and other developments in open data in Canada, see
Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Open Data Current Events” (26 May 2015), Teresa Scassa (blog), online:
<www.teresascassa.ca/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=187:open-datacurrent-events&Itemid=81>.
Provinces actively participating in the open government movement include British
Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador: Alberta,
‘‘Open Government,” online: <https://open.alberta.ca>; British Columbia, ‘‘DataBC,” online: <https://data.gov.bc.ca>; Ontario, ‘‘Sharing Government Data,”
online: <https://www.ontario.ca/page/sharing-government-data> [Ontario, ‘‘Sharing
Data”]; Newfoundland and Labrador, ‘‘Open Government,” online: <www.open.gov.nl.ca>; Quebec, ‘‘An Open and Transparent Government,” online:
<www.gouv.qc.ca/EN/VotreGouvernement/Pages/Gouvernement-ouvert.aspx>.
A list of federal government departments proactively disclosing information is provided
at: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, ‘‘Proactive Disclosure by Department or
Agency,” (TBS, 12 May 2016), online: <www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pd-dp/gr-rg/index-eng.asp> [TBS, ‘‘Proactive Disclosure”]. Since re-launching its open government portal
in June 2013, the various departments of the Government of Canada have collectively
released a total of 701 new data sets: Canada, ‘‘Open Government Analytics,” (15 May
2016), online: <open.canada.ca/en/content/open-government-analytics#top10>.
The Government of Canada has released a map depicting the move towards greater
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motivated by multiple inter-related objectives. These include increased
government transparency,5 open engagement,6 greater citizen participation in
government affairs, general economic development, cost-savings in research,
improved efficiency, and support for innovative uses of publicly-held
information.7

5

6

7

openness in the different levels of government in Canada: Canada, ‘‘Open Government
Across Canada,” (12 July 2016), online: <open.canada.ca/en/maps/open-data-canada>. See also Parliamentary Information and Research Service, ‘‘Government 2.0 and
Access to Information: 1. Recent Developments in Proactive Disclosure and Open Data
in Canada,” by Alysia Davies & Dara Lithwick, Publication No. 2010-14-E (Ottawa:
Library of Parliament, 15 April 2010), online: <www.lop.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/
ResearchPublications/2010-14-e.pdf> [Davies & Lithwick], noting proactive disclosure
at municipal, provincial, and federal levels in Canada.
The concept of ‘‘transparency” has been defined in various ways, including a view of
transparency as an act of ‘‘making relevant, timely and useful information available to
the public in easy-to-access formats”: Health Canada, ‘‘Notice (Revised): Posting
information in the Drug Product Database Online,” (Ottawa: Health Canada, 18 June
2015), online: <www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/prodpharma/activit/announce-annonce/
notice_dpd-avis_bdpp-eng.php> [Health Canada, ‘‘Posting Information”]. More
complex definitions of transparency characterize the concept as ‘‘a measure of the
degree to which the existence, content, or meaning of a law, regulation, action, process,
or condition is ascertainable or understandable by a party with reason to be interested in
that law, regulation, action, process, or condition”: Professor William Mock, ‘‘On the
Centrality of Information Law: A Rational Choice Discussion of Information Law and
Transparency” (1999) 17:4 John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 1069 at 1082 [emphasis
omitted]. Transparency and access to information rights are considered vital to the
public’s ability to participate in the democratic process and hold government officials
accountable for their actions: Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario,
‘‘Transparency, Privacy and the Internet: Municipal Balancing Acts” (Toronto: IPC,
2015) at 1, online: <https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/2015-municipal%20guide-public%20discl-access.pdf> [IPC, ‘‘Transparency, Privacy and the Internet”]. A
clear understanding of what is meant by transparency is crucial, as the concept is central
to the developing open government and open data frameworks (see John Gaventa &
Rosemary McGee, ‘‘The Impact of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives” (2013)
31:S1 Development Policy Rev. S3 at S4, noting that the increasingly common ‘‘social,”
‘‘citizen-led,” or ‘‘demand side” accountability initiatives regularly invoke the concepts
of accountability and transparency as underlying values to the point that these concepts
are at risk of becoming ‘‘buzzwords”). For a detailed discussion of the concept of
transparency, see Amy Conroy & Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Promoting Transparency while
Protecting Privacy in Open Government in Canada” (2015) 53:1 Alta. L. Rev. 175.
‘‘Open engagement” may involve citizen monitoring of government activities in order to
enforce government accountability, citizen participation in government activities and
decision-making through mechanisms such as social media or online reporting of
community issues that relate to government responsibilities: Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and
Open Government” (2014) 6:2 Future Internet 397 at 399, 400 [Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and
Open Government”].
Ibid at 397; Anneke Zuiderwijk & Marijn Janssen, ‘‘Open Data Policies, Their
Implementation and Impact: A Framework for Comparison” (2014) 31:1 Government
Information Q.17 at 17; Marijn Janssen, Yannis Charalabidis & Anneke Zuiderwijk,
‘‘Benefits, Adoption Barriers and Myths of Open Data and Open Government” (2012)
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Both open access and open data are aspects of open government that relate
to the disclosure of information or data8 by governments. Open access is a
familiar concept: freedom of information laws already provide access to
information in the hands of government. This right of access serves the
objectives of transparency and accountability. Government commitments to
open access may include reform and improvement of existing legislation and
processes. They also frequently include new commitments to proactive
disclosure. Proactive disclosure of government information recognizes and
acknowledges that the burden should not always be on citizens to make (and to
pay for) access to information requests for some categories of government
information.9 Government commitments to proactive disclosure encourage
agencies and departments to identify information that is frequently sought and
released under access requests, or information that could and should be made
available to the public as a matter of course.10 This information is then made

8

29:4 Information Systems Management 258 at 261; Canada, ‘‘G8 Open Data Charter —
Canada’s Action Plan,” (8 March 2015), online: <data.gc.ca/eng/g8-open-data-chartercanadas-action-plan> [Canada, ‘‘G8 Action Plan”]; Open Government Partnership,
‘‘Open Government Declaration,” (OGP, 2015), online: <www.opengovpartnership.org/about/open-government-declaration>. Creative ‘‘mashups” of data are also
sometimes specifically encouraged when data are released to the public. ‘‘Mashing up” of
data involves computer programming that combines different data sets with computer
applications to derive customized digital tools. See discussion in Davies & Lithwick,
supra note 4 at 3, and definition of ‘‘mashing up” at 7, n 16. See also discussion in
Elizabeth F. Judge, ‘‘Enabling Access and Reuse of Public Sector Information in
Canada: Crown Commons Licenses, Copyright, and Public Sector Information” in
Michael Geist, ed., From ‘‘Radical Extremism” to ‘‘Balanced Copyright”: Canadian
Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 598 at 631 [Judge,
‘‘Enabling Access and Reuse”].
The difference between ‘‘data” and ‘‘information” has been explained in Rob Kitchin,
The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, Data Infrastructures & Their Consequences
(London: SAGE Publications, 2014) at 1, where Kitchin states that:
Data are commonly understood to be the raw material produced by abstracting
the world into categories, measures and other representational forms — numbers,
characters, symbols, images, sounds, electromagnetic waves, bits — that
constitute the building blocks from which information and knowledge are
created.

9

10

He goes on to explain at 3 that data is different from ‘‘facts, evidence, information
and knowledge” in that it is ‘‘pre-analytical and pre-factual.” In this paper, ‘‘data” is
similarly used to refer to raw facts while information refers to contextualized or
interpreted data.
See comments in Office of the Information & Privacy Commissioner for British
Columbia, ‘‘Investigation into the Simultaneous Disclosure Practice of BC Ferries,” by
Elizabeth Denham, Investigation Report F11-02 (OIPCBC, 16 May 2011) at 2, online:
<https://www.oipc.bc.ca/investigation-reports/1243> [Denham, ‘‘BC Ferries”].
In some cases, government actors have a duty to make certain information available,
including personal information. Where the law requires such disclosures, the relevant
legislation may not specify or restrict the ways in which the information may be made
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available to the public—often through the website of the particular agency or
department. Proactive disclosure may be of reports, internal procedures,
background documents, commissioned research, study results, inspection
reports, or other such materials. It is often the case that these materials are
made available in the format in which they exist (e.g., portable document format,
or PDF).
Open data is a somewhat different concept than open access and proactive
disclosure, although there can be overlaps. Open data serves somewhat different
objectives, although, as with open access discussed above, transparency and
accountability can be among the goals served by open data.11 The open data
movement recognizes that governments collect and compile large amounts of
data that are often extremely useful to the private sector. This can include
statistical and geospatial data, but also data on a broad range of subjects. Open
data programs involve the release of government data sets, in reusable formats,
ideally according to generally accepted standards, and under an open licence that
permits the royalty-free reuse of the data with few or no restrictions. 12 While, as
noted earlier, these data sets can be used for the purposes of increasing
transparency and accountability in government, the explicit goals of the open
data movement are to foster economic development by encouraging innovative
reuse of data, and to encourage civic engagement.13 To this end, ‘‘hackathons”
have become part of open data programs.14
Both proactive disclosure and open data make information and data
available not only for the purpose of serving access rights but also to enable reuse

11

12

13
14

available and government actors may choose to release the information online in an
effort to promote transparency. We argue further below in this guide that in some
instances, the privacy concerns may weigh in favour of releasing the information but
withholding it from online release since this will make the data permanently available.
The benefits of releasing information online that may currently influence the method of
disclosure include that online release may be more cost-effective, may increase
accessibility, and may reduce administrative burdens relating to the maintenance of
the information or the need to respond to access to information requests. See discussion
in IPC, ‘‘Transparency, Privacy and the Internet,” supra note 5 at 5-6.
See discussion in Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech, ‘‘Americans’ Views on
Open Government Data,” by John B. Horrigan & Lee Rainie, online: <www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/21/open-government-data> [Horrigan & Rainie].
Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Open Government,” supra note 6 at 399; Canadian Internet Policy
and Public Interest Clinic, ‘‘Creative Commons Licenses: Options for Canadian Open
Data Providers,” by Kent Mewhort (Ottawa: CIPPIC, 1 June 2012) at 6, online:
<https://cippic.ca/sites/default/files/Creative%20Commons%20Licenses%20%20Options%20for%20Canadian%20Open%20Data%20Providers.pdf> [Mewhort]; Judge, ‘‘Enabling Access and Reuse,” supra note 7 at 618.
Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Open Government,” supra note 6 at 399.
‘‘Hackathons” and ‘‘appathons” involve competitions in which participants work to
create the best consumer-friendly applications. See e.g., Peter Johnson & Pamela
Robinson, ‘‘Civic Hackathons: Innovation, Procurement, or Civic Engagement?” (2014)
31:4 Rev. Policy Research 349.
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and redistribution of the information.15 In this way, open government policies
will play a central role in making more government-held information available
for reuse by members of the public and by other public, private, and not-forprofit organizations.16 The type of information being released by the public
sector—either through proactive disclosure or as open data—is diverse and tends
to reflect the different roles played by the municipal, provincial, and federal
governments. For instance, the City of Toronto’s open data website contains
much information about municipal issues and services, including data about
bicycle paths, building permits, social housing, shelters, garbage and recycling
programs, public transit, and public parks.17 At the provincial level, the
Government of Ontario has surveyed its public to determine areas of priority in
releasing open data and has found that areas of high demand include public
sector salary disclosures, labour force statistics, provincial highway traffic
statistics, and information on the budget and expenditures across the different
ministries.18 At the federal level, the government has made available open data
sets relating to a range of issues; the overwhelming majority of these are
geospatial and statistical data sets.19
15

16
17

18
19

Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Open Government,” supra note 6 at 399 citing Open Knowledge —
Source Code, ‘‘The Open Definition,” online: <opendefinition.org>. See also Treasury
Board of Canada Secretariat, ‘‘Canada’s Action Plan on Open Government 2014—16,”
(TBS, 10 July 2016), online: <data.gc.ca/eng/canadas-action-plan-open-government>
[TBS, ‘‘Action Plan”].
TBS, ‘‘Action Plan,” supra note 15.
City of Toronto, ‘‘Open Data: Data Catalogue,” (City of Toronto: 7 July 2016), online:
<www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=1a66e03bb8d1e310VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD> [Toronto, ‘‘Data Catalogue”]. See also
Mewhort, supra note 12 at 6, noting that ‘‘[m]unicipal open data web portals release
data such as maps of streets and parks, transit routes, transit schedules, electoral
boundaries and city budget information.”
Ontario, ‘‘Sharing Data,” supra note 2.
These along with many other types of data sets can be accessed at Canada, ‘‘Open
Government,” (12 July 2016), online: <open.canada.ca/en> [Canada, ‘‘Open Government”]. In addition to those already released, the website shows requests for new types of
data that are currently being considered, including requests for information on divorce
rates and maintenance payments and for the most commonly dispensed drugs in Canada
(both of which have been forwarded to the appropriate department for consideration).
Other data sets currently under review include databases showing all Canadian
trademarks and patents. Some previous requests for the release of data on the open data
portal have been denied, such as the request for information about the nuclear workforce
in Canada (not released because it constituted private sector data). New data sets are
being developed, including information on hospital emergency room wait times, which is
listed as ‘‘in progress.” In addition to the federal government’s portal, the Treasury
Board of Canada Secretariat operates a portal for proactive disclosure of information.
This features information about travel and hospitality expenses, contracts, position
reclassifications, grant and contribution awards and wrongdoing in the workplace and is
proactively disclosed by individual departments: TBS, ‘‘Proactive Disclosure,” supra
note 3. Note that Canada’s open data portal, which plays a crucial role in open
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To achieve the above-noted goals, the open government policy process
emphasizes a push for release of information;20 however, the emphasis on
making more information available to the public introduces important questions
about protecting the personal information that may be contained within the data
sets being released as open data, as well as the information made available
through proactive disclosure.21 Existing access to information legislation at the
federal and provincial levels already sets parameters for balancing privacy rights
with transparency. In this paper, we examine how this balance may be struck in
the particular context of proactive disclosure and open data. This context is
novel in that it requires governments to release both data and information
proactively to the public at large, and, in the case of open data at least, in readily
reusable formats.
In this paper we outline strategies and techniques for those involved in
decision-making processes about whether to proactively release information or
to release data sets as open data. Public sector freedom of information legislation
mandates a balance between transparency and other competing considerations,
including privacy.22 However, both proactive disclosure and open data raise

20

21

22

government, is considered to be ‘‘[p]articularly strong in geospatial data”: Mewhort,
supra note 12 at 6.
This push for release is seen most clearly in ‘‘open by default” principles reflected in
Canada, ‘‘G8 Action Plan,” supra note 7.
This discussion has also taken place more specifically in the health research context,
where the benefits of making health research data available for reuse must also be pitted
against the risks of disclosure. The Committee on Strategies for Responsible Sharing of
Clinical Trial Data has summarized the four main concerns as:
i. the potential risk to individual privacy;
ii. use of data for ‘‘unfair commercial practices” (a particularly relevant
consideration in the area of clinical drug trials where unfair commercial
practices may reduce the incentive for companies to assume the costs of
researching new treatments);
iii. the dissemination of invalid information produced through secondary analysis
of the information without adequate consideration of the relevant issues of data
quality; and
iv. ensuring proper professional credit for those who conduct the research
involving the original data collection in subsequent publications that rely on
the information.
Committee on Strategies for Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial Data, Sharing
Clinical Trial Data: Maximizing Benefits, Minimizing Risks (Washington, D.C.:
National Academies Press, 2015) at 113.
The second and final considerations are more relevant to the private sector than the
public sector context considered in this paper. The primary focus of this paper is how
to balance personal privacy with the benefits of making more information available to
secondary users. The issue of data quality also arises in the current context and is
discussed further below.
These obligations are set out in a complex web of laws that includes the federal Privacy
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 [Privacy Act], which regulates information-handling practices
for the public sector and numerous access to information statutes. The first Canadian

222 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[14 C.J.L.T.]

distinct challenges in striking that balance.23 The paper uses principles and
concepts that are common across all levels of government in Canada with a view
to helping decision-makers determine when data sets or information targeted for
release raise privacy issues that may need to be balanced against transparency
considerations. In addition, open data and proactive disclosure raise new issues
of scale in the release of data/information: its release in formats and according to
standards that facilitate reuse in the form of data mashups and a broad range of
analytics raise additional privacy concerns.
The strategies suggested below can be applied individually or in combination
depending on the particular data set under consideration. They include data

23

access to information statute was the federal Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
A-1 [Access to Information Act]. Every province now has at least one statute that governs
access to information in the hands of public organizations: Alberta: Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. F-25 [FIPPA-AB]; British
Columbia: Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165;
Manitoba: The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, C.C.S.M. c. F175;
New Brunswick: Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. R10.6; Newfoundland and Labrador: Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
2015, S.N.L. 2015, c. A-1.2; Northwest Territories: Access to Information and Protection
of Privacy Act, S.N.W.T. 1994, c. 20; Nunavut: Access to Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, S.N.W.T. (Nu) 1994, c. 20, as duplicated for Nunavut by s. 29 of the Nunavut
Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28; Nova Scotia: Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
S.N.S. 1993, c. 5; Ontario: Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. F.31 [FIPPA-ON]; Prince Edward Island: Freedom of Information and Protection
of Privacy Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. F-15.01; Quebec: An Act Respecting Access to
Documents Held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information, C.Q.L.R. c.
A-2.1; Saskatchewan: The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S.
1990-91, c. F-22.01; Yukon: Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.Y.
2002, c. 1. In some provinces, there are statutes outlining access to information regimes
for municipal and local public bodies. See e.g., Ontario’s Municipal Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M. 56 and Saskatchewan’s The
Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. L27.1.
Peter Conradie & Sunil Choenni, ‘‘On the Barriers for Local Government Releasing
Open Data” (2014) 31:S1 Government Information Q S10 at S12-S14 [Conradie &
Choenni, ‘‘Municipal Barriers”]; Peter Conradie & Sunil Choenni, ‘‘Exploring Process
Barriers to Release Public Sector Information in Local Government” in J. Ramon GilGarcia, Natalie Helbig & Adegboyega Ojo, eds., Proceedings of the 6th International
Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance, Albany, 2012 (2012, Albany
New York) 5 [Conradie & Choenni, ‘‘Process Barriers”]. It is important to note that
practices can emerge by default when such issues are not managed from an early stage in
the process, and it is therefore crucial that this discussion be held as part of Canada’s
already developing open government movement. See comments in Zuiderwijk &
Janssen, supra note 7 at 19. See similar comments about the need to ensure clear policies
for the release of court information online in: Canadian Judicial Council, Court
Information Management: Policy Framework to Accommodate the Digital Environment,
by Jo Sherman (Ottawa: CJC, 2013) at 15, online: <www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/
AJC/Policy%20Framework%20to%20Accommodate%20the%20Digital%20Environment%202013-03.pdf> [Sherman].
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minimization, cooperation and communication across the many different public
sector actors involved in the open government initiative, individualized
assessment of data sets to clarify the risks and benefits of disclosure,
anonymization, licence requirements, and the use of technological barriers to
the reuse of information disclosed online. The first two strategies—data
minimization and cooperation and communication between government
actors—represent general strategies to guide the development of open
government in a broad sense. The remaining considerations are more
specifically aimed at evaluating individual data sets or information in other
formats that may be disclosed as part of the open government movement.
The decision-making process around the release of government data or
information must be informed by an understanding of the meaning of personal
information. We therefore begin our discussion with a review of the law defining
personal information and reidentification risk as well as a discussion of the
particular category of personal information known as ‘‘publicly available
personal information.”

I. THE DEFINITION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
In the move towards greater openness in government, the need to protect
individual privacy plays a central role.24 While the definition of ‘‘personal
information” is crucial to this balancing act, a specific legislative framework or
body of case law to regulate the developing open government movement does not
yet exist.25 As much of the discussion on the definition of personal information
24

25

The Article 29 Working Party, established under Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament (‘‘Article 29 Working Party”), emphasizes that in releasing information to
the public, government organizations must strike a balance between the need to respect
the individual right to privacy and the need to support public use of government-held
information: EC, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 06/2013 on Open
Data and Public Sector Information (‘PSI’) Reuse (Brussels: EC, 2013) at 3, online:
<ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp207_en.pdf> [Article 29 Data Protection Working Party].
As open government develops, it will be important to emphasize the differences across
the various information regimes and the need for individualized policies for open data
and the broader open government movement. For instance, there appears to be
continuing confusion in terms of the meaning of identifiability for health information
released for the purpose of facilitating secondary research. The area is governed by
federal and provincial privacy legislation and several statutes geared specifically to the
regulation of health information. Discussion of the appropriate threshold to attach to
the concept of ‘‘identifiability” in this particular context may involve unique concerns
relevant to the health research context, such as the need to facilitate medical
advancements. See general discussion in Niko Yiannakoulias, ‘‘Understanding Identifiability in Secondary Health Data” (2011) 102:4 Can. J. Public Health 291. Despite
such differences, access to information schemes will always remain closely tied with the
movement towards more proactive disclosure of government-held information. While
the proactive disclosure of information as part of the open government initiative may
lead to a reduction in access to information requests, there will be a continued role for
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held by government institutions has taken place in the access to information
context, this area of the law provides a useful starting point for understanding
the concept within the emerging open government arena.26
The statutory definitions of personal information vary somewhat across the
different federal and provincial access to information frameworks, but at their
core they typically characterize personal information as ‘‘information about an
identifiable individual.”27 In Ontario, the leading test on identifiability was
explained in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pascoe, and was presented as a
question of whether there is a reasonable expectation that an individual may be
identified upon disclosure of the information.28 The courts in British Columbia,

26

27

28

access to information schemes in order to serve requests for information that is not
proactively disclosed or for information that constitutes personal information belonging
to the requester: Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Open Government,” supra note 6 at 399.
Data protection legislation informs open government policies, given that it is motivated
by the aim of balancing the information needs of different actors with the risks of
disclosing government-held information. Data protection statutes in Canada include the
federal Privacy Act, supra note 22 and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 [PIPEDA], which applies to the private sector. There are
also provincial data protection statutes such as Alberta’s Personal Information
Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5 [PIPA-AB]; British Columbia’s Personal Information
Protection Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 63 [PIPA-BC]; and Quebec’s An Act Respecting the
Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, C.Q.L.R. c. P-39.1 [PPIPS-QC],
all of which have been deemed substantially similar to PIPEDA and therefore replace the
federal scheme in certain situations. The provincial legislation further includes statutes
that replace PIPEDA for certain situations relating to the handling of health
information. In Ontario, see the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004,
S.O. 2004, c. 3, Schedule A; in New Brunswick, the Personal Health Information Privacy
and Access Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. P-7.05; and in Newfoundland and Labrador the Personal
Health Information Act, S.N.L. 2009, c. P-7.01. See also the federal, provincial, and
municipal access to information statutes, supra note 22.
Under PIPEDA, supra note 26, s. 2, ‘‘personal information” is defined as ‘‘information
about an identifiable individual.” The federal Privacy Act, supra note 22, s. 3, defines
‘‘personal information” as ‘‘information about an identifiable individual that is recorded
in any form” and provides examples of information that qualifies as well as exceptions to
the rule at section 3. See further discussion in Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Geographic Information as
‘Personal Information’” (2010) 10:2 O.U.C.L.J. 185 [Scassa, ‘‘Geographic Information];
Teresa Scassa, Jennifer A. Chandler & Elizabeth F. Judge, ‘‘Privacy by the Wayside: The
New Information Superhighway, Data Privacy, and the Deployment of Intelligent
Transport Systems” (2011) 74:1 Sask. L. Rev. 117 at 138; and IPC, ‘‘Transparency,
Privacy and the Internet,” supra note 5 at 3, explaining that information is considered
personal information if there is a ‘‘reasonable expectation that an individual can be
identified from the information itself or in combination with other information, whether
or not it is publicly available.”
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pascoe, 2002 CarswellOnt 3825, [2002] O.J. No. 4300, 166
O.A.C. 88 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 1, additional reasons 2002 CarswellOnt 4072 (Ont. C.A.)
[Pascoe]. The Pascoe test has been applied in numerous tribunals and court decisions in
Ontario. See e.g., Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services) v. Goodis, 2008
CarswellOnt 365, 89 O.R. (3d) 457, 290 D.L.R. (4th) 102, [2008] O.J. No. 289 (Ont.
Div. Ct.), additional reasons 2008 CarswellOnt 3853 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Canada
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Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan appear
to have adopted the Ontario test.29
At the federal level, the concept of ‘‘personal information” is also broadly
defined.30 The result is that personal information may include not only
information that is viewed as highly personal or that may disclose details
relating to ‘‘an individual’s identity, intimacy, dignity and integrity,” but also
less-sensitive information like a person’s name, phone number, or professional
title.31 Much like the provincial threshold set out above, the courts have
explained that to constitute personal information, information must be ‘‘about”
an individual and must permit or lead to the possible identification of that
person.32 In 2008, after Pascoe had provided an interpretation of ‘‘personal
information” as this concept relates to the Ontario legislation, the Federal Court
of Canada took a slightly different approach and set out an alternative test for
identifiability in relation to the federal access to information regime in Gordon v.
Canada (Health).33 Considering the meaning of ‘‘personal information” under
Canada’s Access to Information Act,34 the court (without referring to the Pascoe

29

30

31
32

(Information Commissioner) v. Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation & Safety
Board, 2006 CAF 157, 2006 FCA 157, 2006 CarswellNat 2738, 2006 CarswellNat 1277,
[2007] 1 F.C.R. 203, 267 D.L.R. (4th) 451, [2006] F.C.J. No. 704 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal
refused 2007 CarswellNat 800, 2007 CarswellNat 801 (S.C.C.) [Information v. Accident
Investigation and Safety]; Ontario (Energy Board) (December 27, 2006), Doc. PO-2536,
PA-060066-1 (Ont. Information & Privacy Comm.); Ontario (Community Safety and
Correctional Services) (March 2, 2006), Doc. PO-2456, PA-040268-2 (Information &
Privacy Comm.); Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) (October 31,
2006), Doc. PO-2518, PA-030365-2, PA-040280-1, PA-030407-3 (Information &d
Privacy Comm.); Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) (August 7,
2009), Doc. PO-2811, PA08-213-2 (Information & Privacy Comm.) [Community Safety
and Corrections (IPC-Ont.)].
British Columbia (Health Services) (December 17, 2003), Doc. 03-42 (B.C. Information
& Privacy Comm.); Eastern Regional Integrated Health Authority (June 26, 2007), Doc.
2007-008 (N.L. Information & Privacy Comm.); Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal
(April 19, 2005), Doc. 05-005 (P.E.I. Information & Privacy Comm.); Regina Qu’Appelle
Regional Health Authority (January 9, 2013), Doc. LA-2013-001 (Sask. Information &
Privacy Comm.).
See discussion in Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Legal Information
Related to PIPEDA: Interpretation Bulletin,” (11 December 2015), online: <https://
www.priv.gc.ca/leg_c/interpretations_02_e.asp>, citing Dagg v. Canada (Minister of
Finance), 1997 CarswellNat870, 1997 CarswellNat 869, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403, 148 D.L.R.
(4th) 385, [1997] S.C.J. No. 63 (S.C.C.); Information v. Accident Investigation and Safety,
supra note 28; Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Commissioner, 2003 CSC 8, 2003 SCC 8, 2003 CarswellNat 448, 2003 CarswellNat 449,
REJB 2003-38212, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 66, [2003] S.C.J. No. 7 (S.C.C.) [Information v.
RCMP]. See also Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of Natural
Resources), 2014 CF 917, 2014 FC 917, 2014 CarswellNat 3963, 2014 CarswellNat 4596,
464 F.T.R. 308 (F.C.) at para. 41 [Information v. Natural Resources].
Information v. Natural Resources, supra note 30 at paras. 29, 42.
Information v. Accident Investigation and Safety, supra note 28 at para. 43.
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standard) stated that the proper test for determining whether information was
‘‘about an identifiable individual” asks ‘‘[whether] there is a serious possibility
that an individual could be identified through use of [the] information, alone or
in combination with other available information.”35 As of yet there is little case
law exploring the Gordon standard, though it has been considered in relation to
provincial legislation in Alberta.36 It remains somewhat unclear whether the
Gordon standard is substantively different than that set out in Pascoe.37 It is
worth noting that on the facts of Gordon, the information released had already
led to the identification of at least one individual, so the ministry easily convinced
the judge that the standard of a ‘‘serious possibility” of identification had existed.
As more cases apply Gordon, it may be possible to determine whether and to
what extent the standard of proof required under each test differs.
It is clear that the concept of personal information relates to the risk of
identifiability attached to the information being considered for disclosure to the
public. The issue is that it is often quite difficult to determine reidentification risk
in relation to a specific data set.38 The world of ‘‘big data”39 continues to see
growth in the amount of data available40 and the development of information
33

34
35
36

37

38

Gordon v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2008 CF 258, 2008 FC 258, 2008 CarswellNat
522, 2008 CarswellNat 6510, 324 F.T.R. 94(Eng.), [2008] F.C.J. No. 331 (F.C.) [Gordon].
Access to Information Act, supra note 22.
Gordon, supra note 33 at para. 34 [emphasis added].
This was in relation to the province’s FIPPA-AB, supra note 22. See Alberta
(Employment and Immigration) (January 12, 2011), Doc. F2010-018 (Alta. Information
& Privacy Comm.); Out-Of-Country Health Services Committee (January 26, 2012), Doc.
F2012-04, H2012-01 (Alta. Information & Privacy Comm.). Recently, however,
Alberta’s Court of Appeal reviewed an adjudicator’s decision that driver’s licence and
vehicle licence numbers constituted personal information, determining that the decision
had been reasonable. The court cited both Pascoe, supra note 28 and Gordon, supra note
33 in its review of the authorities on the meaning of ‘‘personal information,” but did not
clearly rely on either standard to come to its final conclusion, and instead was satisfied
that the information constituted ‘‘personal information” because it was possible to
identify a particular person through the information collected with access to the proper
database: Leon’s Furniture Ltd. v. Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner), 2011
ABCA 94, 2011 CarswellAlta 453, [2011] 9 W.W.R. 668, [2011] A.J. No. 338 (Alta. C.A.)
at para. 49, leave to appeal refused 2011 CarswellAlta 1938, 2011 CarswellAlta 1939
(S.C.C.). It is therefore unclear whether Alberta will adopt the Gordon standard in
relation to provincial legislation. In terms of federal legislation, see PIPEDA Case
summary #2010-004 where a manager’s remark revealing an employee’s salary was
found to have infringed the complainant’s privacy, despite the fact that the complainant
had consented to public disclosure of his salary in audited financial statements.
See discussion in Scassa, ‘‘Geographic Information,” supra note 27. In El Emam &
Fineberg, infra note 85 at 15, the authors argue that the serious possibility threshold is
more stringent than the reasonable expectation test.
See UK, Information Commissioner’s Office, Anonymisation: Managing Data Protection Risk Code of Practice (Cheshire, UK: ICO, 2012) at 16, online: <https://ico.org.uk/
media/for-organisations/documents/1061/anonymisation-code.pdf>. [ICO, Anonymisation], noting that data custodians may determine that little or no risk of reidentification
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technologies that enable cross-referencing of information from different
sources.41 This includes information proactively disclosed by governments,
data released as part of the open data initiative, and an unknown amount of
information in the hands of third parties.42 Within this ‘‘data revolution,”43 it
may be almost impossible to determine whether reidentification can be achieved,
or how easy it will be. This places public servants making decisions about the
release of government-held data in a difficult position and raises questions about
the extent to which reidentification risk must be considered in light of unknown
sources of data and emerging information technologies.
The extent to which these future realities are relevant to reidentification risk
is a question that arose indirectly in the recent Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services) v.
Ontario (Information & Privacy Commissioner).44 In that case, a journalist

39

40

41

42

43

44

attaches to the release of information under their control, but may be unaware of the
other data available to facilitate reidentification.
‘‘‘Big data’” refers to ‘‘the massive and ever-expanding volume of digital data”: Scassa,
‘‘Privacy and Open Government,” supra note 6 at 407. It has similarly been defined as
‘‘data linked together, to create a digital picture that is bigger than the sum of the parts”:
Andy Williamson, ‘‘Big Data and the Implications for Government” (2014) 14:4 Leg.
Info. Mgmt. 253 at 253. Rob Kitchin notes that the concept is often explained in relation
to three main concepts: volume, velocity, and variety. It is huge in volume in that it exists
in terabytes or petabytes; it is high in velocity in that it is created in real or near-real time;
and it is available in a variety of formats. Other characteristics that may separate big data
from small data are that it is ‘‘exhaustive in scope,” ‘‘fine-grained in resolution,”
‘‘relational in nature” and ‘‘flexible”: Kitchin, supra note 8 at 68 [emphasis omitted].
Recent estimates indicate that approximately 90 per cent of the world’s data has been
created in the last two years: Jodi LeBlanc, ‘‘Understanding Open Data: Don’t Get Left
Behind” (2014 February 18), Canadian Government Executive (blog), online: <https://
cgexecblog.wordpress.com/2014/02/18/understanding-open-data-dont-get-left-behind>.
Examples of reidentifications that have occurred from what was believed to have been
anonymized data are discussed below in relation to the continued use of anonymization
techniques.
See Kitchin, supra note 8 at Chapter 4, discussing the sources of big data, which include
numerous privately-held devices that enable private production and collection of
information. See also Cynthia M. Gayton, ‘‘Beyond Terrorism: Data Collection and
Responsibility for Privacy” (2006) 36:4 J. Information & Knowledge Management
Systems 377 at 377, noting that ‘‘[l]ittle by little, seemingly insignificant pieces of data are
being collected by not only the government entities and companies with whom
consumers conduct business, but third party data brokers.”
As Kitchin, supra note 8 at Preface, xv explains,
This revolution is founded on the latest wave of information and communication
technologies. . .[which] are leading to ever more aspects of everyday life. . .and the
worlds we inhabit to be captured as data and mediated through data-driven
technologies. Moreover, they are materially and discursively reconfiguring the
production, circulation and interpretation of data [and] producing ‘‘big data.”
Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information
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requested information about the whereabouts of sex offenders registered on
Ontario’s Sex Offender Registry, asking for the information to be disclosed by
reference to the first three letters of the offenders’ postal codes. 45 The adjudicator
who first heard the dispute ordered disclosure of the information, rejecting the
ministry’s claims that the information could be withheld based on the personal
privacy exemption or due to risks presented for law enforcement objectives. 46
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, where the order for
disclosure was upheld.47
In determining whether the information was personal information, the courts
applied the Pascoe test, which, as previously noted, asks whether there is a
reasonable expectation that an individual may be identified upon disclosure of the
information. The ministry argued that there was a reasonable expectation that an
individual could be identified from the information because the information
could be combined with other publicly available information sources to identify
the home addresses of such individuals.48 The ministry cited numerous examples
of publicly available sources that might lead to this outcome, including
information available through the Internet; newspapers; voter registration lists;
occupational licensing registries; property records; crime/court records;
corporate proxy statements; stock holding reports; city directories; and birth,
death and marriage records.49 The adjudicator disagreed and found that the
standard of identifiability had not been established and that the requested
information was therefore not ‘‘personal information” within the meaning of the
personal privacy exemption in section 2(1) of Ontario’s Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).50 The Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court of Canada upheld this decision on judicial review in oral reasons.51

45
46
47
48
49
50

51

& Privacy Commissioner), 2014 CSC 31, 2014 SCC 31, 2014 CarswellOnt 5105, 2014
CarswellOnt 5106, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 674, [2014] S.C.J. No. 31 (S.C.C.) [Community Safety
and Corrections (S.C.C.)]. For a detailed discussion of this case and its implications for
privacy and transparency, see Conroy & Scassa, supra note 5.
Community Safety and Corrections (IPC-Ont.), supra note 28 at 1.
Ibid at 17.
Community Safety and Corrections (S.C.C.), supra note 44.
Community Safety and Corrections (IPC-Ont.), supra note 28 at 7.
Ibid at 7.
Ibid at 11. Note that the adjudicator also rejected the ministry’s attempt to establish an
exemption under section 14(1)(e) and 14(1)(l), which both relate to risks to law
enforcement objectives. The adjudicator’s determination was based on the fact that both
sections depended on the information being personal information: Ibid at 14-16.
Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information
& Privacy Commissioner), 2012 ONCA 393, 2012 CarswellOnt 7088, 292 O.A.C. 335,
[201] O.J. No. 2575 (Ont. C.A.), affirmed 2014 CarswellOnt 5105, 2014 CarswellOnt
5106 (S.C.C.), Community Safety and Corrections (S.C.C.), supra note 44 at paras. 2223.
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The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision provided new guidance on the
standard for identifiability in the access to information context. 52 The court’s
opinion suggests that to show a risk of identifiability, the government must
provide evidence that is directly related to the information under consideration.
This interpretation is largely based on the court’s rejection of what it
characterized as ‘‘unconvincing and generic scholarly research” as evidence of
a risk of identifiabilty in the case.53 This supports the view that going forward,
risk of identifiability will need to be established by reference to specific
information posing an immediately observable risk in the circumstances at hand.
In other words, a general and developing understanding of privacy risks in the
access to information, open data, and proactive disclosure contexts will not be
viewed as adequate reason to withhold information.
To the extent that the decision is relevant to the open government context, it
places public servants deciding on the release of data in a difficult position. Some
data sets may appear entirely free of personal information—but their use in
combination with other data might lead to the identification of specific
52

53

Note that by the time the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, the issues had been
reformulated into a question about the standard of review to be applied to the
adjudicator’s decision, a question of whether the adjudicator had made a reviewable
error by ordering disclosure for purposes inconsistent with FIPPA or with Christopher’s
Law (which governs the Ontario Sex Offender Registry), and whether the Commissioner
had erred by interpreting the scope of FIPPA’s law enforcement exceptions by applying
an elevated evidentiary standard to its provisions: Community Safety and Corrections
(S.C.C.), supra note 44. The personal information issue remained relevant, however,
because the court agreed with the adjudicator that the law enforcement exemptions
depended on the information being personal information within the meaning of FIPPA.
Ibid at para. 60. The Supreme Court of Canada did not specify the literature advanced by
the ministry in its reasons. In the Privacy Commissioner’s initial order, the only literature
reviewed was a piece co-authored by then Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner Ann Cavoukian: Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, ‘‘The New
Federated Privacy Impact Assessment (F-PIA): Building Privacy and Trust-Enabled
Federation,” by Ann Cavoukian (Toronto: IPC, 2009). The decision specifically referred
to the following passage, which had been quoted by the ministry:
Personal information is any information, identifying or otherwise, relating to an
identifiable individual. Specific [personal information] may include one’s name,
address, telephone number, date of birth, age, marital or family status, e-mail
address, etc. For example, credit cards, debit cards, social insurance/security
numbers, driver’s licenses and health cards contain a great deal of sensitive
personal information. Moreover, it is also important to point out that almost any
information, once linked to an identifiable individual, becomes personal
information, be it biographical, biological, genealogical, historical, transactional,
locational, relational, computational, vocational or reputational.
(at section 2.1 in the original paper and discussed in Community Safety and
Corrections (IPC-Ont.), supra note 28 at 7 [emphasis omitted]). The ministry argued
that the description of personal information in the passage ‘‘‘broadens’” the definition
of personal information in the context of the FIPPA-ON, supra note 22. The
Commissioner disagreed and explained that while personal information may be
viewed as an expanding category, its ‘‘hallmark” is the requirement of identifiability.
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individuals. In other cases, anonymization techniques may be applied to data
that are known to contain identifying information. Yet as discussed below, while
information may sometimes appear to have been anonymized, reidentification
may occur when such information is combined with publicly available
information or with the unknown amount of privately-held data.54 The extent
to which outside data sources will become available online is difficult to predict
and will depend on the exercise of discretionary judgment by data custodians in
possession of those data sets. This discretionary authority was emphasized in a
recent Federal Court of Canada judgment reviewing the ministry of natural
resources’ decision not to disclose the names, phone numbers, and business titles
of individuals in the private sector following an access to information request for
those details.55 The court agreed with the minister that the information
constituted personal information under the federal Privacy Act and determined
that the decision to withhold the information was reasonable. 56 By the time the
decision had reached the court, the personal information at issue was publicly
accessible through online searches, and the applicant argued that the government
was therefore required to disclose the data.57 The court, however, determined
that the fact that the information was publicly accessible did not change the fact
that the minister had the discretionary authority, not an obligation, to disclose
the personal information.58 The court refused to usurp that authority and
indicated that it was ‘‘a matter for the parties to address and not the court.” 59
Given the uncertainties about the amount of outside information that may
be relevant to reidentification risk, the challenge for public servants is to know
how significant the risk is, and how to weigh this level of risk with the competing
transparency values. Because the risks and benefits of disclosure depend on the
nature of the information itself, decisions relating to the release of individual
data sets require a case-by-case assessment. Considering the information that
may be contemplated for open data or proactive disclosure, it may sometimes be
clear that the data do not contain personal information about any individual.
For example, this may be the case with data about the location of bicycle station
facilities in a given municipality, boundaries for urban green spaces, or the
number of drinking fountains in public parks.60 In such cases the goals of open
54

55
56
57
58
59

Based on this and other experiences in which reidentifications have taken place through
use of what was previously believed to have been anonymized information, emerging
academic discussion warns of the vulnerabilities of anonymization techniques. See
discussion in Paul Ohm, ‘‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization” (2010) 57:6 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1701; and Jon P. Daries et al,
‘‘Privacy, Anonymity, and Big Data in the Social Sciences” (2014) 57:9 Communications
ACM 56 at 57.
Information v. Natural Resources, supra note 30.
Ibid at paras. 52-59.
Ibid at paras. 54-56.
Ibid at para. 61.
Ibid.
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government support the view that such information should be released. 61
Sometimes data may contain information that would be highly unlikely to lead
to the reidentification of specific individuals—e.g., general statistics relating to
the prevalence of pollen allergies.62 When this type of information cannot assist
in reidentification, it may be viewed as non-identifying information and
released.63 In other cases however, the information may be potentially useful
60

61

62

63

This information is provided on the City of Toronto’s open data portal: Toronto, ‘‘Data
Catalogue,” supra note 17.
The significant interest in harnessing public transit data illustrates how open data
(in either the public or private sector) can support innovation. The release of
public transit data has so far resulted in numerous useful applications and new
commercial products. The situation introduced complex questions about the
copyright in information relating to public transit routes and schedules. This was
partly motivated by concerns over the quality of information being released to
the public; however, as open data evolves, data custodians in both the public and
private sectors are adjusting to a cultural shift in which concerns about how
information will be used do not provide a compelling reason for refusing to
disclose data. See discussion in Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Public Transit Data through an
Intellectual Property Lens: Lessons about Open Data” (2014) 41:5 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 1759 at 1777 [Scassa, ‘‘Public Transit Data”].
In some instances, non-personal information may be subject to a specific statutory
exception. For instance, the federal Access to Information Act provides exemptions for
information relating to the management of the economy, national security and defence,
international affairs, law enforcement, Cabinet confidences, and information that is
subject to solicitor-client privilege: Access to Information Act, supra note 22, ss. 15-26. See
discussion of exemptions in the federal access to information scheme in Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Access to Information and Privacy: Process and
Compliance Manual (OPC, 2008) ch. 5 at 59ff, online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/au-ans/
atip-aiprp/manual_e.pdf>. It is worth noting that the Canadian government has
identified four high priority categories of information, which may provide further
guidance in making the decision to proactively disclose information in this category. The
high priority areas represent information relating to national statistics, election results,
government budget information, and national maps. Secondary priorities, identified as
areas of ‘‘high value data” include information relating to companies, crime and justice,
earth observation, education, energy and environment, finance and contracts, geospatial
data, global development, government accountability and democracy, health, science
and research, social mobility and welfare, statistics, and transportation and infrastructure. The government has expressed a commitment to engaging with the public to
further assess user needs and specific interests for open government data: Canada, ‘‘G8
Action Plan,” supra note 7. Priority goals are also emerging in other jurisdictions. In the
U.S., these appear to be primarily driven by the Obama administration’s focus on
increasing transparency, public engagement, and collaboration, while the European
Commission emphasizes the economic gains to be derived from the open data movement:
Zuiderwijk & Janssen, supra note 7 at 17.
Health Canada, ‘‘Overview of Factors Affecting the Risk of Re-identification in
Canada,” by Khaled El Emam (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2006) at 5, online:
<www.ehealthinformation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/2006-Overview-of-Factors.pdf>. [El Emam].
Ibid at 5.
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to secondary users while also presenting a reidentification risk. This concern may
arise, for example, with restaurant inspection reports;64 health and safety reports
on personal services offered within a city;65 or geodemographic data such as
information relating to family structure, marital status, and language spoken
within households in different regions across Canada.66 The extent to which this
type of data presents a risk of reidentification when combined with other
information will depend on the exact nature and level of specificity within the
information. One relevant information source that may be combined with
individual data sets to reveal personal information is publicly available personal
information, which is defined in the next section.

II. THE DEFINITION OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE PERSONAL
INFORMATION
‘‘Publicly available personal information” can still be personal information,
and has been specifically included in private sector data protection legislation. 67
Some publicly available personal information is collected or disclosed by
governments.68 Examples include the types of data found in public registries
(e.g., court files or land titles registries).69 Because the public can already access
this type of personal information, albeit with effort required to conduct the
64

65

66

67

68

69

A finding that employees at a specific restaurant were not properly washing their hands
could, for example, be combined with other available information to identify the
delinquent hand-washers.
See City of Ottawa, ‘‘Public Health Inspection Data — Restaurant” (Ottawa: City of
Ottawa, 2014), online: <data.ottawa.ca/dataset/public-health-inspection-data/resource/2301656b-3695-4bee-9048-e0312441f637>, which provides inspection data for
food establishments and for personal care services such as those provided in hair salons
and barbershops, nail salons, and tattoo shops.
See e.g., Statistics Canada, ‘‘GeoSearch,” (Statistics Canada, 11 April 2016), online:
<https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/geo/ref/geosearch-georesearche-eng.cfm>. New research is exploring individual levels of comfort among
Americans with respect to government disclosures as part of the growing open
government movement. 82 per cent of adults surveyed expressed that they were
comfortable with government sharing of health and safety records from restaurants,
while 62 per cent were okay with government sharing of information about criminal
records of individual citizens. In contrast, only 22 per cent were comfortable with
government sharing of information about mortgages for individual homeowners. See
these and additional findings at: Horrigan & Rainie, supra note 11.
See, for example, PIPEDA, supra note 26 and the accompanying Regulations Specifying
Publicly Available Information, S.O.R./2001-7, s.1 [Regulations Specifying Publicly
Available Information].
See discussion of publicly available personal information in the related context of
PIPEDA in Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Publicly Available Personal Information”
(2013) 11:1 C.J.L.T. 1 at 10 [Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Publicly Available Personal
Information”].
Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Open Government,” supra note 6 at 403; Elizabeth F. Judge,
‘‘Copyright, Access, and Integrity of Public Information” (2008) 1 J.P.P.L. 427 at 430.
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physical or online search for the records, it might be viewed as unobjectionable to
release the data as open data.70 However, the broad disclosure of publicly
available personal information in digital formats introduces certain privacy
concerns that must be addressed as part of the open government policy process.
Moreover, the release of this type of personal information as open data may
conflict with certain areas of the law as it applies to secondary uses of this
information.
With respect to the first issue, the online disclosure of publicly available
personal information may raise privacy concerns that are not as relevant when
the information is only available in hardcopy.71 For example, information stored
exclusively in a physical registry (and therefore that requires a certain degree of
effort to retrieve) becomes easy to access and disseminate once it is released
online. An example from the U.S. illustrates some of the issues. 72 During the
campaign leading up to the vote in California on a proposal to amend the state
constitution to ban same-sex marriage (also known as Proposition 8), opponents
of the amendment obtained information about the names, street addresses, and
contribution amounts of donors who had supported the ban with contributions
of $100 or more.73 The information was already publicly accessible as election
contribution information,74 but the opponents published an interactive map
broadly disseminated online that gave viewers quick visual representations of
70

71

72

73

74

The court in Gombu v. Ontario (Assistant Information & Privacy Commissioner), 2002
CarswellOnt 1599, 59 O.R. (3d) 773, 214 D.L.R. (4th) 163, [2002] O.J. No. 1776 (Ont.
Div. Ct.) at para. 28, additional reasons 2002 CarswellOnt 2132 (Ont. Div. Ct.), leave to
appeal allowed 2002 CarswellOnt 2874 (Ont. C.A.) took this view and held that the
disclosure of personal information in electronic format where that is already available in
hardcopy represents only a ‘‘minimal further intrusion upon. . .personal privacy.” See
discussion of the case in IPC, ‘‘Transparency, Privacy and the Internet,” supra note 5 at 4.
Canadian Judicial Council, ‘‘Synthesis of the Comments on JTAC’s Discussion Paper on
Open Courts, Electronic Access to Court Records, and Privacy,” by Lisa M. Austin &
Fréderic Pelletier (CJC, 2005) at 17, online: <http://www.publications.gc.ca/site/eng/
319625/publication.html> [Austin & Pelletier]
While the situation described would need to be considered under the applicable
American legislation, the example illustrates the privacy considerations that arise when
publicly available information that was once only available in hardcopy is published
online. As such, it is relevant to consider this situation in the Canadian environment,
where certain types of publicly available information have also traditionally been held in
hardcopy and where the interest in making such information available online will likely
continue to grow.
Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Open Government,” supra note 6 at 404; David Lourie,
‘‘Rethinking Donor Disclosure after the Proposition 8 Campaign” (2009) 83:1 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 133 at 134.
The rules requiring disclosure of donation contributions have become a point of debate.
On the one hand, it is argued that disclosure is required in order to ensure transparency in
relation to the role played by money in campaigns; on the other hand, due to the potential
for negative consequences such as the type of publicity experienced by donors who
supported Proposition 8, it is argued that identifying information relating to donors
should not be made public at all. See discussion in Lourie, supra note 73 at 136.
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donor name and amount matched to specific plotted addresses on the map.75 The
publication of the map made the information much more accessible to the public
and raised privacy concerns that were not as relevant when the information was
simply held within a public registry.76 It is important to consider that the digital
availability of publicly available personal information was unlikely to have been
thoroughly contemplated when decisions were being made to make different
types of personal information publicly available.77 In addition to the information
becoming more visible, a crucial consideration in deciding whether to make this
type of personal information available online is that the move would make the
data available for cross-referencing with other non-identified data, thereby
increasing the risk of reidentification of purportedly anonymized data. 78
In addition to the above, the release of publicly available personal
information as open data may conflict with other areas of the law regulating
the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information. While open data
involves the release of information in reusable formats and encourages reuse
under open licences,79 some secondary users are restricted in terms of how they
can use publicly available personal information. The issue is particularly relevant
in the case of commercial organizations whose activities fall under the scope of
the federal Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA) or its provincial equivalents, which set out rules for the collection,
use, and disclosure of personal information by private sector companies engaged
in commercial activities.80 While these statutes would generally not apply to uses
75
76

77

78

79

80

Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Open Government,” supra note 6 at 404.
Ibid. See also Lourie, supra note 73 at 133-135, explaining that the impact on individuals
who were revealed as having supported Proposition 8 included targeted protests and
boycotts of businesses.
See Lourie, supra note 73 at 138, making the same argument in relation to campaign
disclosure laws that led to the situation with Proposition 8 donor information, discussed
above. See also Austin & Pelletier, supra note 71 at 6, discussing the shift in the balance of
the open court principle and privacy considerations as information technology continues
to advance. Finally, see comments in Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Balancing Privacy with Online
Access to Court and Tribunal Decisions: Lessons for Open Government” (16 March
2015), Teresa Scassa (blog), online: <www.teresascassa.ca/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=182:balancing-privacy-with-online-access-to-court-and-tribunal-decisions-lessons-for-open-government&Itemid=80> [Scassa, ‘‘Balancing
Privacy”].
See again discussion of reidentification risk and the definition of personal information
(above).
Office of the Chief Information Officer & Ministry of Labour, Citizens’ Services and
Open Government, ‘‘Open Information and Open Data Policy” (Office of the CIO,
2011) at 7, online: <www.cio.gov.bc.ca/local/cio/kis/pdfs/open_data.pdf>. See also
Canada, ‘‘G8 Action Plan,” supra note 7, emphasizing the aim of releasing ‘‘as much data
in as many open formats as possible.”
PIPEDA, supra note 26. The provincial legislation includes PIPA-AB, supra note 26;
PIPA-BC, supra note 26; and PPIPS-QC, supra note 26. With respect to the public sector
legislation, nothing in the Privacy Act, supra note 22 specifically prohibits the online
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for journalistic or private purposes,81 they would limit the use of the information
by private sector companies engaged in commercial activities. Specifically, for
publicly available personal information released to the public, private sector
actors are limited by the rule that secondary use of the information must be
directly related to the purpose for which the information was collected. 82 These
restrictions as set out in PIPEDA (or in B.C. or Alberta’s PIPA statutes) limit
how private sector actors may use information released by government. It is
therefore important to consider that by making such data available under an
open licence that permits its unrestricted use, governments would likely facilitate
unauthorized uses of the information. As such, we consider options for dealing
with publicly available personal information as well as other personal
information in the open government context further below.

81

82

disclosure of publicly available personal information. Under s. 69(2), publicly available
personal information is specifically excluded from the rules in ss. 7 and 8, which set out a
consent-based regime for government use of personal information beyond that for which
the information was collected (including specific and limited exemptions to the
requirement that consent be obtained).
Austin & Pelletier, supra note 71 at 18. One of the important issues to consider is that
private individuals (such as nosy neighbours or co-workers) may be motivated to access
the information once it is made accessible in digital form; however, this activity would
not be covered by PIPEDA. See Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Publicly Available Personal
Information,” supra note 68 at 16, discussing the release of records of judicial and quasijudicial bodies as a category of publicly available personal information and noting that
‘‘some of the privacy concerns that relate to administrative tribunal decisions stem from
the potential for nosy neighbours, co-workers, ex-spouses or even malefactors to browse
electronic decisions for information about individuals.” The issue as it relates to court
documents is considered in further detail below.
PIPEDA, supra note 26, s. 7(1)(d) allows organizations to collect personal information
without the knowledge or consent of the individual if the information is publicly
available and is specified by the regulations. The regulations set out a list of categories of
‘‘information and classes of information” that represent publicly available personal
information for the purposes of the Act: telephone directory information, professional or
business directories, registry information, records of judicial or quasi-judicial bodies,
and published information: Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information, supra
note 67, s.1. For instance, a private sector organization may only use information that
appears in a government-run registry for purposes directly related to that for which the
information appears in the registry. In the case of registry information, this purpose may
be set out in the authorizing legislation; in other cases, permissible collection, use, or
disclosure of the information will be judged against the standard of what a reasonable
person would consider reasonable in the circumstances. See further discussion, including
a discussion of the comparable provisions in the B.C. and Alberta legislation, in Scassa,
‘‘Privacy and Publicly Available Personal Information,” supra note 68 at 14.
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III. STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING PRIVACY IN OPEN DATA AND
PROACTIVE DISCLOSURE
(a) Data Minimization
The new information environment into which more and more government
data and information is being released introduces a need to reassess approaches
to collecting and disclosing personal information within the public sector. 83 To
avoid creating unnecessary privacy risks, Ontario’s former Information and
Privacy Commissioner recommended that public sector actors adhere to a policy
of ‘‘data minimization” according to which interactions with the public ‘‘begin
with non-identifiable interactions and transactions as the default.” 84 By
collecting only what personal information is required to operate government
programs, public sector actors can alleviate some of the privacy risks that arise
when information relating to those same programs is released to the public. The
policy of data minimization does not need to be limited to new collections by
government departments; data minimization principles can also apply to the
disclosure of information to be used for secondary purposes. In such cases, the
amount of personal information disclosed should be limited to what is required
to fulfill the intended purposes, whether it be health research, innovation, or
increased transparency in relation to government operations. 85
In terms of information collected by government, however, it is important to
note that a policy of data minimization does not address all of the concerns that
may exist with respect to information already in the hands of government. To the
extent that this information may contribute to the goals of the open government
movement, it should be considered for proactive release in accordance with the
guidelines set out in this paper. Moreover, it remains the case that the
83

84

85

See discussion in Lourie, supra note 73 at 139, specifically arguing for a new framework
for disclosure of publicly available personal information because of the emerging
information environment and resultant privacy concerns. The issue of publicly available
personal information is discussed in more detail below.
Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, ‘‘Privacy and Government 2.0: The
Implications of an Open World,” by Ann Cavoukian (Toronto: IPC, 2009) at 10, online:
<https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/priv-gov-2.0.pdf> [Cavoukian, ‘‘Privacy
and Government 2.0”]. See also IPC, ‘‘Transparency, Privacy and the Internet,” supra
note 5 at 8.
The need to minimize disclosures of personal health data intended for secondary use to
what is required to fulfill the intended purposes is discussed in Khaled El Emam & Anita
Fineberg, ‘‘An Overview of Techniques for De-Identifying Personal Health Information” (Ottawa: CHEO Research Institute, 2009) at 6. The authors note at 7 that even
where the law permits disclosure of personal information, data custodians should
consider releasing information in anonymized form if this satisfies the legitimate needs of
the secondary user. See also Sherman, supra note 23 at 50, emphasizing a similar principle
of ‘‘[c]ollection [l]imitation” as a way to address privacy concerns relating to the online
dissemination of information about court proceedings, an issue that is discussed in
further detail below.
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government must collect a great deal of personal information in order to operate
its various programs effectively. 86 Due to these considerations, data
minimization as a best practice only represents a starting point to addressing
the privacy concerns relating to the release of government information.

(b) Cross-Government Communication
A second general best practice involves cooperation and communication
between different levels of government as well as between different agencies and
departments within the same government, in order to facilitate knowledge
sharing about the decision-making process relating to the release of governmentheld information. Effective communication between government actors could
also spread awareness about the kind of information being considered for release
as part of the broader open government initiative.87 As discussed below, such
information may be relevant to the assessment of reidentification risk for new
data sets.88 This effort towards communication and cooperation may require a
86

87

88

It is worth emphasizing that even when a policy of data minimization is in place, errors in
judgment and over-collection of personal information may still occur. This was seen, for
instance, with the controversial Longitudinal Labour Force File (LLFF), which was
operated by Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC). A debate arose
surrounding the database in the late 1990s after Canada’s Privacy Commissioner at
the time, Bruce Phillips, performed an audit of the database. Commissioner Phillips
acknowledged HRDC’s need to collect information required to fulfill its mandate of
monitoring health and safety issues in the workforce, administering income security
programs, and assisting individuals to secure paid employment, but challenged HRDC’s
extensive collection and retention of information beyond what was required to perform
its duties. Prior to the discussion instigated by the LLFF, it was believed that government
departments were only collecting and storing personal information to the extent required
by the mandates of the individual departments, and that privacy was being protected by
keeping information organized into ‘‘silos” within each department. The audit revealed,
however, that HRDC was compiling information from different departments to create
individual profiles that were attached to personal identifiers. The LLFF was eventually
scrapped due to the privacy concerns relating to the creation of these extensive personal
profiles: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Annual Report to Parliament
1999-2000 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2000) at 64, online:
<www.priv.gc.ca/information/ar/02_04_08_e.asp>; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, News Release, ‘‘Privacy Commissioner Applauds Dismantling of
Database” (29 May 2000), online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/archive/
02_05_b_000529_e.asp>.
Such practices might increase consistency in the type of information released across all
municipalities or all provincial governments, which in turn might enhance certain uses of
such data for comparative analyses or for the design of applications that could be used in
multiple cities or regions.
ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 40, arguing that:
Organisations should seek to share information about planned disclosures with
other organisations, to assess risks of jigsaw identification. For example it would
be helpful for public authority A to know that public authority B is also planning
an anonymised disclosure at the same time, one on health and one on welfare,
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restructuring of relationships between departments as well as between decisionmakers at the ground level and higher-level politicians communicating
information about the open government movement to the public.89
As with data minimization, communication and cooperation between
government actors only serve as a starting point in addressing the risks
involved in making more and more government-held information available to the
public. For the case-by-case decisions that must be made for individual data sets
and other types of information, public servants must consider the particular
privacy issues that relate to the specific type of information being contemplated
for release. This paper proposes a series of questions to use in evaluating
individual data sets being contemplated for release, particularly where the
information may be made available as open data.

(c) Assessing Privacy Risks
When privacy concerns arise in relation to the release of information as part
of government programs and services, Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) may
be used to gain a better understanding of the risks and benefits of disclosing the
information at issue. The Canada Revenue Agency defines a PIA as ‘‘a process
used to determine how a program or service could affect the privacy of an
individual. . .[which may] also help to avoid or lessen possible negative effects on
privacy that might result from a program or service.” 90 PIAs have become
standard practice in evaluating the privacy risks of various programs and services
in many parts of Canada’s public sector.91 When a government department plans

89

90

91

both using similar geographical units. They can then assess the risks collectively
and agree [on] mitigation for both datasets.
See Zuiderwijk & Janssen, supra note 7 at 26, noting that ‘‘[a] large gap exists between the
key objectives of the open data policies which reflect the ambitions of politicians on the
one hand, and, on the other hand, the realities of public servants working for government
organizations” and arguing for ‘‘systematic collaboration” to address such issues. See
also Roy, supra note 1 at 426, arguing for a national (as opposed to federal) strategy for
the coordination of open data initiatives.
Canada Revenue Agency, ‘‘Privacy Impact Assessment,” (Ottawa: CRA, 2016), online:
<http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/prvcy/pia-efvp/menu-eng.html> [CRA, ‘‘PIAs”].
Another definition offered by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat describes a
PIA as:
[A] process that helps departments and agencies determine whether new
technologies, information systems and initiatives or proposed programs and
policies meet basic privacy requirements. It also assists government organizations
to anticipate the public’s reaction to any privacy implications of a proposal and
as a result, could prevent costly program, service, or process redesign.
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, ‘‘Privacy Impact Assessment Guidelines: A
Framework to Manage Privacy Risks Guidelines,” (TBS, 2006), online: <www.tbssct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=12451&section=HTML> [TBS, ‘‘PIA Guidelines”].
The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat has listed a number of situations in which a
PIA should be used, including in the design of a new program or service as well as where
information previously collected for a government program is to be used for research or
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to undertake an initiative that requires the disclosure of personal information, a
PIA may help illustrate the benefits and risks of disclosure in the specific
circumstances at hand and may facilitate an approach that avoids unnecessary
consequences for personal privacy.92
To evaluate records being considered for proactive disclosure or data sets
being considered for release as open data, public servants may similarly benefit
from a set of predetermined questions designed to underscore the privacy risks at
stake as well as the potential benefits of disclosure. Based on the standard PIA

92

statistical purposes. See ‘‘A checklist to determine when to do a PIA” in TBS, ‘‘PIA
Guidelines,” supra note 90. The Government of Canada’s ‘‘Directive on Privacy Impact
Assessment” (Canada, ‘‘Directive on Privacy Impact Assessment,” (2010), online:
<https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=18308>) requires that most federal
government departments use PIAs to evaluate their programs and services. See
discussion of the federal policy in Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
‘‘Expectations: A Guide for Submitting Privacy Impact Assessments to the Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada,” (Ottawa: OPC, 2011) at 1, online: <https://
www.priv.gc.ca/information/pub/gd_exp_201103_e.pdf> [OPC, ‘‘PIA Guide”]. PIAs
have played a role in the developing open government movement: see Office of the
Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, ‘‘Early Notice and
Privacy Impact Assessments to the OIPC under the Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act” (OIPCBC, 2012), online: <https://www.oipc.bc.ca/guidance-documents/1434>, promoting the use of PIAs in the access to information
context. On its open data website, the City of Calgary similarly notes the use of PIAs in
responding to access to information requests: City of Calgary, ‘‘Open Data Catalogue,”
online: <https://data.calgary.ca/OpenData/Pages/DatasetListingAlphabetical.aspx>. Finally, the City of Toronto supports the use of PIAs in a privacy policy
designed to support the city’s efforts to move towards open government: City of
Toronto, ‘‘Protection of Privacy Policy,” (Toronto: City of Toronto, 2014) online:
<http://www1.toronto.ca/City%20Of%20Toronto/City%20Clerks/Corporate%20Information%20Management%20Services/Files/pdf/P/ProtectionOfPrivacyFinalAODA.pdf>. The use of PIAs for open government has been considered as a possible
best practice or as a mandatory statutory requirement: Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party, supra note 24 at 6.
For instance, the Edmonton Police Service was criticized for actions taken as part of
Project Operation Warrant Execution (Project OWE). Project OWE involved the online
release of pictures and personal details of individuals who had outstanding warrants and
was intended to publicly shame such individuals into coming forward to resolve the
outstanding matters. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Alberta issued an
investigation report on the events, which criticized the police for having disclosed more
personal information than what was necessary to carry out its responsibilities in a
reasonable manner. The Commissioner argued that a PIA could have helped to identify
the privacy impact of the operation (which would have facilitated police action to reduce
that impact). See Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta,
‘‘Investigation Report F2014-IR-01: Investigation into ‘Project Operation Warrant
Execution’ for Compliance with the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act” (OIPCAB, 2014) online: <https://www.oipc.ab.ca/media/127989/F2014001IR.pdf>; and discussion of the events in Chris Berzins, ‘‘Public Shaming by Public
Bodies: The Investigation of Project OWE” (8 May 2015), Privacy Scan (blog), online:
<www.privacyscan.ca/issues/2015/may-8-2015-public-shaming-by-public-bodies-theinvestigation-of-project-owe>.
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process93 used in the evaluation of programs and services as well as relevant
questions about the disclosure of records or data sets as identified in the
surrounding literature, we offer a series of questions and factors to be considered
as part of the decision-making process as it relates to records or data sets being
contemplated for disclosure to the public.

(i) Table 1: Questions Relating to Purpose of Disclosure/Privacy Risk
Question

Explanation/Examples

1. What is the intended purpose of E.g., support for government transparency,
disclosure of the information/release open engagement, economic development,
of data?
research, or innovation.94

93

94

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has identified six key steps of a PIA:
i. Identify all personal information within the program or service being evaluated
and determine how it will be used;
ii. Apply a four-part test (developed in R. v. Oakes, 1986 CarswellOnt 95, 1986
CarswellOnt 1001, EYB 1986-67556, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 53 O.R. (2d) 719,
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7 (S.C.C.)) that asks:
a. whether the measure is demonstrably necessary to meet a specific need;
b. whether the measure is likely to be effective in meeting that need;
c. whether the loss of privacy is proportional to the need; and
d. whether there exists a less privacy-invasive method of achieving the same end
to measure necessity and proportionality for highly invasive initiatives or information
technologies;
iii. Apply the ten privacy principles (accountability; identifying purposes; consent;
limiting collection; limiting use; disclosure, and retention; accuracy; safeguards;
openness; individual access; and challenging compliance);
iv. Map out where personal information will be sent after collection;
v. Identify the existence and level of privacy risks; and
vi. Determine ways to eliminate or reduce privacy risks to an acceptable level.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Fact Sheets: Privacy Impact
Assessments,” (OPC, 2011), online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/resource/fs-fi/
02_05_d_33_e.asp>; OPC, ‘‘PIA Guide,” supra note 91. The Treasury Board of
Canada Secretariat (TBS) describes a similar process and has issued questionnaires to
assist in the application of PIAs. The TBS divides the process into the following four
key steps:
(i) project initiation, which involves defining the scope of the PIA process and
designating resources to accomplish the PIA;
(ii) data analysis of the personal information contained in the relevant data set;
(iii) privacy analysis, which involves completion of privacy analysis questionnaires
(which reflect the ten privacy principles outlined above in the guide to PIAs
provided by the OPC); and
(iv) a privacy impact assessment report.
The final step is considered crucial as a privacy impact assessment report could be
used for future situations in which the privacy concerns are similar: TBS, ‘‘PIA
Guidelines,” supra note 90.
See above discussion on the goals of open government.
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Question

Explanation/Examples

2. Does the data set contain any
identifying variables? If so, are the
identifying variables relevant to the
purpose of disclosure identified under question 1?

Includes any information that relates directly to an individual—e.g., name, full
address, telephone number, email address,
or social insurance number.95

3. Does the data set contain any
quasi-identifiers? If so, are these
quasi-identifiers relevant to the purpose of disclosure identified under
question 1?

Variable(s) that may indirectly identify a
given individual—e.g., postal code or other
location information, sex, country of birth,
profession, criminal history.96

4. Is the information being disclosed If there is only a temporary need for the
for a transitory purpose?
public to have access to the information,
this may weigh against online disclosure
(which makes the information permanently
available).97
5. If the data set contains quasiidentifiers, are any individuals uniquely identifiable by reference to
those variables?

95

96
97

98

May result from the inclusion of any quasiidentifier or combination of quasi-identifiers that relate only to one individual
within the sample; the more quasi-identifiers included the greater the probability
that the data include a unique individual as
described by those variables.98

El Emam & Fineberg, supra note 85 at 7. If a data set includes identifying variables, it is
clearly not de-identified or anonymized: El Emam, supra note 62 at 4.
El Emam & Fineberg, supra note 85 at 9.
See IPC, ‘‘Transparency, Privacy and the Internet,” supra note 5 at 7, where the
Commissioner argues that
[I]n the case of a minor variance application, the application and supporting materials
are created for purposes related to the application process. Once the application
process is complete and the records have reached the end of the applicable retention
period, there may be no ongoing need for those records to be made publicly available.
In such cases, online disclosure, which makes the information permanently available
online, may not be required in order to fulfill the government’s goal of supporting
transparency.
See discussion in El Emam, supra note 62 at 7, emphasizing uniqueness within data
containing quasi-identifiers as a factor contributing to the risk of reidentification. The
author notes at 13 that the inclusion of postal codes and other geographical information
as quasi-identifiers within data that reflects personal information may increase the
likelihood that an individual will be unique and therefore identifiable. As noted above,
the Government of Canada’s open data portal is viewed as ‘‘[p]articularly strong in
geospatial data”: see Mewhort, supra note 12 at 6.
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Question

Explanation/Examples

6. In its identified form, is the
information highly personal?

E.g., data relating to a person’s physical or
mental health condition, racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious beliefs
or other beliefs of a similar nature, sexual
life, criminal history, allegations of criminal
conduct or involvement in ongoing criminal proceedings.99

7. Are any of the variables in the data E.g., characteristics that are visible such as
easy to identify in specific indivian illness that can be outwardly observed,
duals?
information about a person’s physical
appearance.100
8. Is it reasonably likely that any one Requires consideration of outside sources
individual could be reidentified from of information that may be combined with
the data set?
the data, other factors explored above in
relation to the Pascoe standard of reidentification.
9. Could reidentification be expected E.g., potential for damage, distress, financial loss.101
to have serious negative consequences for the individual(s) concerned?
The first question in the table above is meant to engage the balance between
privacy and the benefits of disclosure. If the second and third questions reveal
that the information at issue includes personal or quasi-personal identifiers that
are not relevant to the purpose for disclosure, the identifiers should be removed
99

100
101

See Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, ‘‘Dispelling the Myths
Surrounding De-identification: Anonymization Remains a Strong Tool for Protecting
Privacy,” by Ann Cavoukian & Khaled El Emam (Toronto: OPC, 2011) at 4, online:
<https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/anonymization.pdf> [Cavoukian & El
Emam], noting that personal health information is a particularly sensitive type of
personal information. See also the description of ‘‘[s]ensitive personal data” in: ICO,
Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 49-50. It is important to emphasize, however that the
definition of personal information remains broad enough to encompass information that
may be viewed as relatively less sensitive than health data or the other types of data noted
above. For instance, in Information v. Natural Resources, supra note 30, the court held
that the name, phone number, and professional title of individuals working in the private
sector constituted personal information under the federal Privacy Act.
El Emam, supra note 62 at 20.
ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 20. See also Sherman, supra note 23 at 9, discussing
these and other more specific risks relevant to the online distribution of information
about court cases (such as risks to the fairness of a trial or to vulnerable people involved
in criminal or family proceedings).
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before the information is released. If, however, both parts of the second or third
question are answered in the affirmative and the personal information has not
been made publicly available,102 the challenge will be to balance the goal of
releasing the data in a form that serves the purpose for disclosure and the need to
protect individual privacy. In this type of situation, if the data are required for a
transitory purpose, the risk to personal privacy may support the decision not to
release the information online where it will be made permanently available. In
cases where it is determined that the online release of the information would be
appropriate, anonymization techniques may provide an option for balancing the
public’s right to information with the need to protect individual privacy. In
addition, the privacy risk may be addressed through the use of licence restrictions
or technological barriers to reuse of information. We review these options in turn
before summarizing the best practices in a decision-making tree below.

(d) Anonymization of Data
Data that have been anonymized have been rid of all personal identifiers that
would allow for reidentification to occur; various tools have been developed to
assist in the process.103 The approach used may depend on what type of data are
being anonymized.104 For instance, statistical data can be aggregated, 105
randomized or coded,106 or pseudonymized.107 Personal information contained
in qualitative data may be redacted.108 Where the data contain quasi-identifiers,
102
103

104

105

106
107

See further discussion on ‘‘publicly available personal information” above.
Khaled El Emam, Guide to the De-Identification of Personal Health Information (Boca
Raton: CRC Press, 2013); Latanya Sweeney, ‘‘k-Anonymity: A Model for Protecting
Privacy” (2002) 10:5 Intl. J. Uncertainty, Fuzziness & Knowledge-Based Systems 557;
and Ross Fraser & Don Willison, ‘‘Tools for De-Identification of Personal Health
Information,” Prepared for the Pan Canadian Health Information Privacy (HIP) Group
(September 2009), online: <https://www.infoway-inforoute.ca/en/component/edocman/supporting-documents/500-tools-for-de-identification-of-personal-health-information>, discussing the following: aggregation of data, k-anonymity, data reduction,
data modification, data suppression, and pseudonymization. See also El Emam &
Fineberg, supra note 85 at 17-25, discussing the techniques of randomization, irreversible
coding, reversible coding, heuristics, and analytics.
It is worth noting that the use of anonymization techniques to facilitate the disclosure of
information held by the government relates to an additional issue of transparency in that
government actors should clearly communicate policies about how personal information
collected for government programs may later be used. Where information may be
anonymized for disclosure to the public, this should be communicated to individuals
whose data are being collected along with information about how the risks inherent in
such disclosures will be managed. See ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 40,
recommending that this information be disclosed within privacy policies.
See ibid at 36, noting that depending on the level of granularity, aggregation of data can
be considered relatively low risk in terms of reidentification, but may make it difficult to
carry out the individual analysis required by some forms of research.
El Emam & Fineberg, supra note 85 at 10.
Pseudonymization involves replacing ‘‘real world” identities with a pseudonym that
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other techniques such as heuristics or analytics may be used.109 Because no two
documents or data sets are alike, both the approach used and the nature of the
data itself will affect the degree of reidentification risk that remains once the data
are released.110 Options for anonymizing data (which are not mutually exclusive)
are outlined in Table 2, below.

(i) Table 2: Anonymization Techniques111
Technique

Description

Notes

Aggregation

Displays statistical data as
totals, averages or in ranges,
with personal identifiers removed.

May be particularly useful for
population statistics and demographic information; may
not adequately protect against
reidentification for data with
small number of cell counts;
may impede some forms of
research that require specific
information about individuals
whose information is contained
within the data.

Randomization

Involves the ‘‘scrambling”
of direct and indirect identifiers in data to create a
credible data set.

May provide a useful way to
retain identifiers such as postal
codes and telephone numbers
where the purpose for disclosure requires reference to such
variables.

108
109
110

111

users can refer to in order to understand the data without accessing the actual identity of
the individual: ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 49, 51.
Ibid at 22.
El Emam & Fineberg, supra note 85 at 10.
See Cavoukian & El Emam, supra note 99 at 13, noting that:
The risk threshold should reflect the amount of re-identification risk that the
health information custodian is willing to take. For example, one approach is to
ensure that for each record contained in the data set that describes characteristics
of a data subject, there are at least four other individuals also represented by
records in the data set who share these same characteristics.
Discussion of these various options is found in El Emam & Fineberg, supra note 85; El
Emam, supra note 62; Cavoukian & El Emam, supra note 99; and Information and
Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, ‘‘The Unintended Consequences of Privacy
Paternalism,” by Ann Cavoukian, Alexander Dix & Khaled El Emam (Toronto: IPC,
2014) at 17, online: <https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/pbd-privacy_paternalism.pdf>.
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Notes

Coding/ Pseudony- Replaces ‘‘real world” idenmization
tities with pseudonyms that
allow users to associate data
with the pseudonym but not
the real personal identity.

May be particularly useful for
clinical health data as it allows
for reidentification of individuals by the data custodian
(which may be useful where
research reveals information
that should be communicated
to the individual about whom it
relates).

Heuristics

Uses threshold rules to determine the risk that (i) an
individual may be uniquely
identifiable through any
combination of quasi-identifiers; (ii) outside sources of
information may be combined with the data to identify one or more individuals.

May be particularly useful for
geodemographic data; usually
accounts for a limited number
of variables; unlikely to sufficiently protect against complex
data (e.g., epidemiologic analysis that includes many variables).

Redaction

Conceals personal identifiers (e.g., by blacking out
text).

Useful for qualitative data sets
but lacks consistent methodological approach.

Data Suppression

Eliminates details that
May significantly distort data
would lead to a high risk of (especially where suppression is
reidentification.
not random).

Sampling

Normally used in combination
Involves the release of a
sample of records included with other de-identification
in a broader data set.
techniques.

Using the above options alone or in combination, data custodians can
attempt to remove personal information from government-held data and make
more information available to the public. Yet, while many advocate for the
continued use of anonymization techniques in order to enable public release of
information that would otherwise be withheld,112 recent experiences with data

112

Support for the use of anonymization techniques is often accompanied by an
acknowledgment that anonymization can mitigate but not erase the privacy risks. See
discussion in Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, ‘‘Big Data and
Innovation, Setting the Record Straight: De-identification Does Work,” by Ann
Cavoukian & Daniel Castro (Toronto: IPC, 2014), online: <www.ipc.on.ca/images/
Resources/pbd-de-identification_ITIF.pdf>; Cavoukian & El Emam, supra note 99; El
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anonymization have called the value of these techniques into question. There
have been cases in which one or more individuals have been reidentified from
information released on the assumption that it had been cleared of personal
details.113 A much-cited example followed the disclosure of twenty million search
queries by media corporation America Online (AOL); in this case the disclosure
of the information was meant to support independent research on Internet
behaviours.114 The belief that the data had been anonymized was invalidated
when two reporters used clues in the information along with outside sources to
identify a woman and link her to her individual search queries. 115
The type of reidentification that occurred in the AOL case can be expected to
occur more frequently as the amount of information available to the public
grows and as the technologies that facilitate mass and indefinite storage116 and

113

114
115

116

Emam, supra note 62 at 22. See also comments in Khaled El Emam et al, ‘‘A Systematic
Review of Re-Identification Attacks on Health Data” (2011) 6:12 PLoS One e28071 at 1,
noting the particular gains that have been derived from the secondary use of de-identified
data in the areas of population health research, health services research, and public
health. The authors also note at 2 that an exception may apply for genomic data due to
evidence that anonymization techniques may not sufficiently protect against reidentification for this type of information.
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party notes that there are a number of reasons
for which an individual might be motivated to attempt to reidentify persons whose
information is released in the open government framework or elsewhere, including to
reveal identities for commercial or law enforcement purposes, to reveal personal
information that may be newsworthy or relevant in an adversarial political setting, or
simply to satisfy individual curiosity: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra
note 24 at 16. See also ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 23.
See a description of these events in Ohm, supra note 54 at 1717.
Ibid at 1718. In this work, Ohm also describes two other high profile examples of
reidentifications of individuals through the use of data that was believed to have been
anonymized. In the first, William Weld, Governor of Massachusetts, was identified from
data relating to state employee hospital visits, which was released by the Group
Insurance Commission, a government organization. In the second, Netflix released
records of user ratings and details on movies watched by individual customers.
Researchers then illustrated the ease with which individuals could be linked with their
ratings and to the movies they had watched with just a few details about the individual.
See also discussion in Daries et al, supra note 54 at 3. See additional examples of
reidentifications in El Emam & Fineberg, supra note 85 at 13.
See Kitchin, supra note 8 at 70, discussing the ongoing replication of data on the internet,
and at 31 explaining the move to digital storage solutions for long-term archiving of data.
See also Rob Kitchin & Tracey P. Lauriault, ‘‘Towards Critical Data Studies: Charting
and Unpacking Data Assemblages and Their Work” (2014) The Programmable City
Working Paper 2, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474112>, discussing modern storage solutions and machine data mining and
analysis of data. Former Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario Ann
Cavoukian has noted that ‘‘[w]e can no longer speak meaningfully of information
destruction, as we once did with paper records, because digital bits and bytes have now
attained near immortality on the Internet, thwarting efforts to successfully remove them
from the public domain”: Cavoukian, ‘‘Privacy and Government 2.0,” supra note 84 at 4.

STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY IN OPEN DATA

247

manipulation of these data become increasingly sophisticated. 117 Due to these
concerns, academic study into the strength of anonymization techniques
continues. 118 At present, data custodians can test the strength of
anonymization techniques by attempting to reidentify individuals prior to
disclosure using outside sources of information. This exercise can be approached
from the perspective of a ‘‘motivated intruder” who has no prior knowledge of
the personal details in the information but wishes to reidentify one or more
individuals from the data set.119 It is also good practice to review the information
to determine whether someone with prior knowledge of a certain individual
whose personal information is reflected in the data set would be able to reidentify
that person and learn new personal information about him or her in the
process.120
In evaluating the strength of the anonymization technique and the extent to
which the anonymization is likely to protect against reidentification risk, data
custodians should return to the purpose of disclosure to evaluate whether the risk
to personal privacy is relevant to the objective. For instance, if the purpose of
disclosure is to increase transparency with respect to government operations, the
likelihood that releasing the information will genuinely support that objective
should play a role in the decision-making process. Where the transparency value
to be gained from disclosure is high, the situation may lean towards disclosure in
anonymized form despite some degree of risk of reidentification. On the other
hand, where the privacy risk remains high but the transparency value is less clear,
it may be appropriate to withhold the information or take further steps to
address the risk (e.g., through applying additional anonymization techniques

117

118

119

120

Finally, see comments in Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 24 at 22;
and ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 29.
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, ‘‘Evaluating
the Government of British Columbia’s Open Government Initiative,” by Elizabeth
Denham, Investigation Report F13-03 (OIPCBC, 25 July 2013) at 33, online: <https://
www.oipc.bc.ca/investigation-reports/1553> [Denham, ‘‘BC Open Government”];
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 24 at 13.
See e.g., Ohm, supra note 54; Sweeney, supra note 103; Khaled El Emam, Ann Brown &
Philip AbdelMalik, ‘‘Evaluating Predictors of Geographic Area Population Size Cutoffs to Manage Re-identification Risk” (2009) 16:2 J. American Medical Informatics
Association 256.
ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 22. A four-step approach to evaluating
reidentification risk has been offered in Cavoukian & El Emam, supra note 99 at 13,
which is to consider ‘‘the re-identification probability; the mitigating controls that are in
place; the motives and capacity of the data recipient to re-identify the data; and the extent
to which an inappropriate disclosure would be an invasion of privacy.”
For instance, it might be asked whether parents might be able to use health information
to learn details their teenage child had not previously disclosed to his or her parents.
Another example would be a family member who knows about a crime committed by one
of his or her relatives and may be able to learn additional details of which he or she was
not previously aware: see these and other examples in ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38
at 25.
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outlined in Table 2, above). An additional consideration is the fact that removal
of all personal identifiers is likely to sacrifice some quality in the data, making it
unfit for certain secondary purposes.121 As the release of quality data is one of
the underlying goals of open data,122 this presents an important consideration
and emphasizes the need for good metadata123 as well as data literacy
initiatives.124
121

122

123

124

This is an important consideration in the open government context, where the issues of
fitness for use and the need for metadata are particularly relevant. Depending on the level
of deidentification, the process may skew the data and make them less useful for certain
purposes. See Daries et al, supra note 54 at 57, noting that ‘‘[i]t is impossible to anonymize
identifiable data without the possibility of affecting some future analysis in some way,”
and further discussion of the issue at 61-63. See further discussion and examples of data
fitness issues in R. Devillers et al, ‘‘Towards Spatial Data Quality Information Analysis
Tools for Experts Assessing the Fitness for Use of Spatial Data” (2007) 21:3 Intl. J.
Geographical Information Science 261; Sylvie Servigne, Nicolas Lesage & Thérèse
Libourel, ‘‘Quality Components, Standards, and Metadata” in Rodolphe Devillers &
Robert Jeansoulin, eds., Fundamental of Spatial Data Quality (London: ISTE, 2006) 179;
R. Devillers et al, ‘‘How to Improve Geospatial Data Usability: From Metadata to
Quality-Aware GIS Community” (Workshop delivered at the A AGILE Conference,
Aalborg, Denmark, 8 May 2007) [unpublished], online: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/253972014_How_to_Improve_Geospatial_Data_Usability_From_Metadata_to_Quality-Aware_GIS_Community>.
Emphasis on quality data is reflected in open data principles: Canada, ‘‘G8 Action Plan,”
supra note 7. As noted above, open data specifically supports the open government goals
of innovation and economic development. See again Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Open
Government,” supra note 6 at 399.
The primary way to communicate the known limitations of data to potential users is to
include metadata with each new dataset disclosed in the open government context.
Metadata is defined simply as ‘‘data about the data” and can include information about
the authors and editors of a document; the date that a document was created, edited,
accessed, emailed, or printed; or the name, type, and size of a file. In addition to helping
to clarify limitations of data for secondary use, metadata may serve to support the goals
of increased government transparency and accountability in the open government
movement. For instance, it could be relevant to know when a particular data set was
created, as this could indicate a latest possible time at which the government knew of the
information. Metadata might also reveal whether a document was backdated, which
might be highly relevant to enforcing transparency and accountability in a given
situation: see Peter S. Kozinets, ‘‘Access to Metadata in Public Records: Ensuring Open
Government in the Information Age” (2011) 28:1 Computer & Internet Lawyer 25 at 25;
Zuiderwijk & Janssen, supra note 7 at 19, 22; Conradie & Choenni, ‘‘Municipal
Barriers,” supra note 23 at S11-S14; Conradie & Choenni, ‘‘Process Barriers,” supra note
23; Conroy & Scassa, supra note 5. Canada’s ‘‘Open Government Portal” currently
contains data sets with some accompanying metadata: Canada, ‘‘Open Government,”
supra note 19.
Cavoukian and El Emam argue for ‘‘the use of proper de-identification techniques and
re-identification risk measurement techniques. . .[which enable] a high degree of privacy,
while at the same time preserving the required level of data quality necessary for the
secondary purpose”: Cavoukian & El Emam, supra note 99 at 12. While it is useful to
consider the ways in which data quality might be maintained while ensuring adequate
protection for privacy, this requires a certain level of data literacy. In this way, the
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(e) Licence Restrictions
Because of the uncertainties relating to the use of anonymization techniques
to protect individual privacy, and because some anonymized government-held
data released as open data may have been derived from highly personal
information, additional precautions may be required before the data can be
disclosed. When analyzing the information reveals a particular privacy risk for a
given data set, decision-makers may consider several options. First, data
custodians may decide not to release the information as open data.125 If,
however, the transparency value or other benefit from disclosure outweighs the
privacy risk and it is determined that the risk does not reach the threshold set by
the governing legislation (e.g., the serious possibility of identification threshold
set by the Federal Court of Canada in relation to Ontario legislation in Gordon v.
Canada),126 an option would be to release the information with warnings to
potential users about their responsibilities in using the information. These could
be imposed in addition to existing open government licences127 to remind users

125

126
127

situation highlights the importance of active promotion of data literacy to accompany
the move towards open government. See general comments in Denham, ‘‘BC Open
Government,” supra note 117 at 36; and Janssen, Charalabidis & Zuiderwijk, supra note
7 at 264. See also Conroy & Scassa, supra note 5.
In such circumstances, it might still be considered appropriate to release the data if a
request is made in the access to information context where specific limitations might be
attached to use (e.g., a purpose limitation or restriction on the disclosure for the recipient
of the information). Data recipients who intend to use information for a specific purpose
may be open to mitigating controls that are not feasible when the information is released
to the public at large (such as limitations on the ability to disclose the data). In some cases
this may allow secondary users to access better quality data that can be used for limited
purposes. See discussion in ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 37; and Cavoukian &
El Emam, supra note 99 at 14.
Gordon, supra note 33.
Many governments have adopted some version of an open licence for use with open data.
The development of the federal government’s open government license involved
consultations and redrafting in which matters such as the need for clear definitions of key
terms and for clear and accessible language were addressed. See Canada, ‘‘Open
Government Licence — Canada,” (2015), online: <open.canada.ca/en/open-government-licence-canada> [Canada, ‘‘Open Government Licence”]; Canada, ‘‘Open
Government Licence Consultation Report,” (2015), online: <open.canada.ca/en/
open-government-licence-consultation-report>; Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Canada’s Open Government Licence V2.0 is Released” (18 June 2013), Teresa Scassa (blog), online:
<www.teresascassa.ca/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=131:canada’sopen-government-licence-v20-is-released&Itemid=81>; and Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Canada’s
New Draft Open Government License” (6 December 2012), Teresa Scassa (blog), online:
<www.teresascassa.ca/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=113:canadasnew-draft-open-government-licence&Itemid=83>. Similar action has been taken at
the provincial level by the Government of Alberta: Alberta, ‘‘Open Government Licence
— Alberta,” online: <data.alberta.ca/licence> [Alberta, ‘‘Open Government Licence”]. It is important to note that the existence of an open licence does not mean that
there are no intellectual property rights in the information being disclosed; the licence
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that their right to use data disclosed to the public by any level of government
does not entitle them to use personal information as defined under the relevant
federal and provincial laws.128 For information that raises significant privacy
concerns, additional licence provisions could:
i. reiterate that data has been deliberately anonymized;129
ii. remind users that they are prohibited from using the data to reidentify
individuals;130 and
iii. require that users alert the licensor to any reidentifications that occur. 131
One way of communicating these conditions would be to require that users agree
to the limitations before the information can be accessed or downloaded.132 An
example of a licence provision for information that has been anonymized is:

128

129

130

131

132

may instead explicitly authorize use of a protected work under specified conditions. See
discussion in Scassa, ‘‘Public Transit Data,” supra note 60 at 1780.
The federal government licence refers to the definition of personal information in the
Privacy Act, supra note 22. The Government of Alberta’s licence refers users to the
FIPPA-AB, supra note 22: Canada, ‘‘Open Government Licence,” supra note 127; and
Alberta, ‘‘Open Government Licence,” supra note 127. Note that under both licences,
users are also required to specifically acknowledge the source of the information as part
of secondary uses. This requirement allows subsequent users to understand the ‘‘chain of
custody” and makes it possible to trace information back to its source to understand the
limitations and bias within the data. The issue is therefore attached to a broader
discussion on the need for good metadata in open government, discussed in the notes
above. Promoting emphasis on the chain of custody of government data, see Cavoukian
‘‘Privacy and Government 2.0,” supra note 84 at 5. Note, however, that some open data
advocates decry the addition of these types of conditions in open data licences because
they may make reuse more challenging. See Mewhort, supra note 12.
Note, however, that it is not recommended that the steps taken to anonymize the data be
released as this information may make it easier to reidentify individuals from within the
data set: El Emam, supra note 62 at 23.
It is important to emphasize that data sharing agreements and other licence restrictions
are typically only used to address the limits on use of information shared with a specific
third party: ibid at 19. In order for licence agreements to help address the privacy
concerns in the open government context, significant development in terms of resources
devoted to investigation and enforcement of these rules would be required: Daries et al,
supra note 54 at 10; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 24 at 18, 25.
The difficulties in enforcing licensing restrictions are also noted in ICO, Anonymisation,
supra note 38 at 38.
See ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 41, recommending that governance procedures
include a plan of action for when reidentifications occur through secondary use of
purportedly anonymized data released by the public sector. Possible actions include
notifying the individuals who have been reidentified and assisting in remedial action as
well as improving the anonymization process that was used to avoid future privacy
breaches.
This is sometimes done in the clinical trials context where users attempt to access data for
secondary purposes. Another option used in that context is to prohibit analyses of the
data on personal computers (i.e., users must use standard software programs that have
been deemed secure and that must be used on the website run by the data custodian). See
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Personal information has been removed from this data set. The licence
governing use of this information does not authorize you to reidentify
individuals from within this data. If secondary use of this information
reveals the identity of one or more individual(s), users must contact
[department name or contact person].

For publicly available personal information, a sample provision might be:
The licence governing use of these data does not authorize you to
combine the information with outside sources of data for the purposes
of reidentifying individuals from within any other anonymized data.
The licence remains subject to the rules on collection, use, and
disclosure of publicly available personal information in privacy and
personal data protection legislation in Canada.

An important issue to consider is that licence limitations may restrict the
legal interoperability of open government data licences, making it more difficult
to combine the information with other data for potentially useful purposes. The
concept of interoperability of data sets includes technical as well as legal
dimensions, and pertains to how easily and effectively different data sets can be
combined or ‘‘mashed-up.” Legal interoperability means that the licences for
different data sets contain essentially the same terms and conditions, making it
easy to combine and reuse them without being unduly limited by the more
restrictive licence provisions. For instance, by combining open data sets released
by the Government of Canada, contestants in a hackathon created numerous
applications to assist users with respect to their international travel needs,
decisions about where to live or work in Canada, decisions about commuting to
work, questions relating to vehicle fuel efficiency, and more. 133 A lack of legal
interoperability may mean that certain data sets cannot be combined in these
potentially useful ways, which runs counter to the growing effort to make
information—especially that which is released online—more useful to secondary
users. Furthermore, a lack of licence interoperability may specifically impede
some of the goals that underlie open government (particularly the objective of
supporting commercial development and innovation when data are released
online as open data).134 This consideration weighs in favour of using license

133

134

discussion in Committee on Strategies for Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial Data,
supra note 21 at 117.
Canada, ‘‘Canada Codes! CODE 2014 — Winners Showcase,” (2015), online: <open.canada.ca/en/winners-showcase>.
See Mewhort, supra note 12, discussing ongoing efforts to ensure that open data licences
allow for data interoperability and discussing the use of licences that have been created
for data and other works released in the Creative Commons as a model for governments
to consider. The report acknowledges the need to protect personal information that may
inadvertently be disclosed and suggests that a specific provision might be included to
restrict secondary users from using personal information contained within the data (as
well as information attached to ‘‘third-party rights the releasor is not authorized to waive
or license; and data subject to other intellectual property rights, including patents, trade-
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restrictions only where there is a significant concern over the risk of
reidentification or an apparent conflict with another area of privacy or data
protection law rather than as a matter of routine.

(f) Technological Barriers to Reuse
The inclusion of specific licence restrictions may mitigate some of the privacy
concerns relating to the disclosure of government-held information and the
option may be applied alone or, if required, in combination with technological
barriers to reuse. The option to include technological barriers may be
particularly relevant where the information being considered for disclosure
constitutes publicly available personal information that holds both a high
transparency value and a significant privacy risk.135 As noted above, a specific
privacy concern related to the digital release of publicly available personal
information is that this makes the data available for cross-referencing with other
non-identified data, which may increase the risk of reidentification of
purportedly anonymized data.
One option (provided the situation is not one in which the government is
required by law to release the information in an open format) is to release
information in restricted proprietary formats such as PDF (thus using proactive
disclosure instead of open data). This has been done, for instance, with the
release of public sector salary information in Ontario.136 The idea behind the
disclosure of information relating to salaries in the public sector is that by
making the details available to taxpayers, the government will be made more
accountable for the way it spends taxpayer money.137 Because the data contain
personal details of the individual public sector employees however, there are

135

136

137

marks and official marks, and design rights: ibid at 18). The European Commission has
endorsed the use of Creative Commons Licenses to support the reuse of information
released by governments: see EC, Press Release, ‘‘Commission Encourages Re-use of
Public Sector Data” (17 July 2014), online: <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14840_en.htm> and discussion at Timothy Vollmer, ‘‘European Commission Endorses
CC Licenses as Best Practice for Public Sector Content and Data” (17 July 2014),
Creative Commons (blog), online: <creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/43316>. See
also discussion on open data licences and the use of the Creative Commons model in
Scassa, ‘‘Public Transit Data,” supra note 60 at 1803; and Judge, ‘‘Enabling Access and
Reuse,” supra note 7, advocating that the government use Crown Commons licensing for
public sector information until copyright reforms address the restrictions imposed by
Crown copyright.
Austin & Pelletier, supra note 71 at 11, discussing the question in relation to court
documents, a matter that is examined in more detail below.
The disclosure of this information is required for certain salary ranges paid by the public
sector under the Public Sector Salary Disclosure Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 1 Schedule A.
See comments and the disclosure of information for 2013 with links to the information
for previous years at Ontario Ministry of Finance, ‘‘Public Sector Salary Disclosure 2014
(Disclosure for 2013),” (Toronto: 2016), online: <www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/publications/
salarydisclosure/pssd>.
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privacy concerns attached to the release of the information online. The potential
for the information to be reused for purposes beyond holding the government
accountable for the salaries of its employees is partially addressed by the fact that
the information has so far only been released in HTML (Hyper Text Markup
Language) and PDF versions, which limits the ability to cross-reference the
information.138 It is important to note, however, that the media and other users
of government data continue to seek out new ways to get around the
technological barriers that have been imposed in order to facilitate crossreferencing and other secondary uses of the information.139 In fact, online
applications make it possible for the average user to defeat these technological
barriers and to manipulate data into machine-readable formats.140 Thus, a high
degree of interest in the information may mean that technological barriers will
provide only limited protection for the privacy interests at issue.
A second possibility is to limit the searchability of the information online. 141
The Canadian Legal Information Institute (CanLII)—which operates an open
online database of Canadian laws, regulations, court and tribunal
decisions—uses this technique.142 Over a million Canadian court decisions
have been made available on the website on the condition that CanLII not allow
the decisions themselves to be searchable through Google or other search
engines.143 While the restrictions on the searchability of court decisions have
138
139

140

141
142

143

Ibid.
See Stuart A. Thompson, ‘‘Unlocking Ontario Public Sector Salary Data” (2014) 16:2
Media 27, providing a tutorial on how to manipulate the data in the format in which it
has so far been released.
See e.g., the following application that allows users to transform a pdf document into
excel format: Nitro, ‘‘PDF to Excel Converter,” online: <https://www.pdftoexcelonline.com/en>.
IPC, ‘‘Transparency, Privacy and the Internet,” supra note 5 at 10.
Canadian Legal Information Institute, online: <www.canlii.org>. This initiative has
had clear advantages in terms of making the law more readily accessible to Canadians.
See discussion in Scassa, ‘‘Balancing Privacy,” supra note 77.
The rule that the information held on CanLII would not be searchable by Google or
other search engines appears to be based on an agreement between the courts and CanLII
rather than a specific order prohibiting CanLII from making the information available in
this way. See Austin & Pelletier, supra note 71 at para. 75, discussing the limits on the
searchability of Canadian court records online and noting the early existence of a
‘‘general consensus that unrestricted bulk searches should not be permitted to the public
generally.” The rule is reflected in CanLII’s privacy policy, which states that:
CanLII adheres to the principle of openness and transparency of legislative and
judicial processes, and recognizes their fundamental importance in democratic
societies. In order to minimize the negative impact of such transparency on the
privacy of those involved in cases leading to judicial decisions, CanLII does not
permit its case law collections to be indexed by external search engines.
The policy further notes that for the sake of openness and transparency, court
decisions and other documents are published ‘‘in the form in which they are received
from the institutions that issue them, such as official publishers, courts and law

254 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[14 C.J.L.T.]

prompted a debate on the costs for transparency and openness when it comes to
information about the law,144 the limitation was meant to provide a degree of
privacy to the individuals involved in proceedings—especially those in the often
sensitive areas of family, criminal, and immigration law.145 Technological
restrictions also prevent the court databases from being downloaded in bulk.
However, the limitations of such technological restrictions were highlighted when
a Romanian-based website scraped decisions from CanLII and published them

144

145

societies.” Finally, the policy reinforces that external search engines are prohibited
from indexing the text and style of cause of court decisions published by CanLII:
Canadian Legal Information Institute, ‘‘Privacy Policy,” online: <https://
releve.canlii.org/en/info/privacy.html>.
See also IPC, ‘‘Transparency, Privacy and the Internet,” supra note 5 at 10-11, noting
that generally speaking, the main weakness of relying on the designation of site
content as ‘‘‘[o]ff [l]imits’” to search engines is that it is a voluntary standard (though
one that major search engines like Google, Bing, and Yahoo typically adhere to).
The Alberta courts previously operated a searchable database of provincial court
judgments; the site now redirects users to CanLII: Alberta Justice and Solicitor General,
‘‘Court Decisions,” online: <https://justice.alberta.ca/programs_services/courts/Pages/decisions.aspx?WT.svl=programs>. On the debate brought on by this change, see
Shaunna Mireau, ‘‘Trusting the System” (20 January 2015), Slaw (blog), online:
<www.slaw.ca/2015/01/20/trusting-the-system>; and Addison Cameron-Huff, ‘‘CanLII’s Licensing Terms: How Much Access Should Canadians Have to Court Decisions?”
(30 January 2015), Addison Cameron-Huff, Tech Lawyer (blog), online: <https://
www.cameronhuff.com/blog/canlii-licensing-terms/index.html>. See also Addison
Cameron-Huff, ‘‘Why Google Can’t Build A Case Law Search Engine in Ontario” (11
February 2014), Addison Cameron-Huff, Tech Lawyer (blog), online: <https://
www.cameronhuff.com/blog/ontario-case-law-private/index.html>, critiquing the
scheme in Ontario under which only CanLII, Quicklaw and WestLaw are provided
bulk access needed to create searchable databases of court decisions.
For instance, in the Globe24h case discussed immediately below, individuals complained
to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada after discovering that personal
information about them appeared online when their names were searched in a search
engine. This information included the fact that one woman had worked in the sex trade
(which was revealed in a case in which she acted as a witness), details of a hostile child
custody dispute, and financial and medical information: Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada, PIPEDA Report of Findings #2015-002: Website That
Generates Revenue by Republishing Canadian Court Decision and Allowing Them to be
Indexed by Search Engines Contravened PIPEDA, (OPC, 5 June 2015), online: <https://
www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2015/2015_002_0605_e.asp> [OPC, ‘‘Globe24h”]. See also comments in Christine Dobby, ‘‘Canadians Upset with Romanian Website that Exposes
Court Case Details,” The Globe and Mail (5 January 2015), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/the-law-page/canadians-upset-overromanian-website-that-exposes-court-case-details/article22284367>. See an explanation of CanLII’s approach to shielding personal information from broad access through
Google and other search engines at: Colin Lachance, ‘‘Google, González and Globe24h”
(26 May 2014), Slaw (blog), online: <www.slaw.ca/2014/05/26/google-gonzalez-andglobe24h>. See also Scassa, ‘‘Balancing Privacy,” supra note 77, discussing the personal
nature of divorce cases; cases heard by workers compensation, human rights, and
pension and disability tribunals; and personal injury trials, all of which are relevant to the
content released on CanLII.
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on a website that could be indexed by search engines, which made the
information much easier to access on the Internet.146 Thus, while limiting the
searchability of online information is a possible strategy, it is not a perfect
solution.147
It should be noted that the privacy problems resulting from the
circumvention of the technological restrictions could also be attributed to the
failure of some courts to follow recommendations that personal identifiers not be
included in some types of decisions, or that the inclusion of personal information
in decisions be limited only to what is necessary to make the decision
comprehensible and transparent. This highlights the point that technological
barriers on released data alone are unlikely to suffice. In addition, technological
barriers may limit innovative uses of the data. This example therefore highlights
the need for new approaches to information management to address the
challenges of the new digital era in which those releasing information must deal
with risks that did not present in the previous paper-based world.148 In
particular, the value of data minimization, discussed above, may provide a ‘‘first
line of defence” in protecting individual privacy.149
Even where the privacy risk is high, the use of technological barriers for
government-held information that is released online may be viewed as
controversial given the objectives of both proactive disclosure and open
data.150 This controversy was highlighted in 2014 when Treasury Board
President Tony Clement stated that some information requested under the
access to information framework could not be released in its original format
146

147
148
149
150

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada became involved following
complaints about Globe24h’s activities. In response to those complaints, Globe24h
argued that it was entitled to use the information without obtaining consent from the
individuals to whom it related because it was publicly available information (see supra
note 82, explaining that under the terms of PIPEDA, organizations can use publicly
available information without consent provided the use is consistent with that for which
the information was first collected). Globe24h argued that its purpose was to make
information freely available online. The Privacy Commissioner disagreed and determined that the organization’s true purpose was ‘‘to use personal information contained
in court and tribunal decisions for the purpose of generating revenue through its paid
removal service.” Globe24h had initially charged a fee to have the personal information
removed from the website; the policy was later changed to requiring a written request. It
appears, however, that the company continued to charge a fee for removal of documents
by negotiating payment on a case-by-case basis. See OPC, ‘‘Globe24h,” supra note 146 at
paras. 10, 68, 70. See also discussion in Dobby, supra note 146.
See discussion in IPC, ‘‘Transparency, Privacy and the Internet,” supra note 5 at 1.
Sherman, supra note 23 at 10.
See discussion in Scassa, ‘‘Balancing Privacy,” supra note 77.
See comments in Jordan Press, ‘‘Information Czar Investigating Whether Government
Refusing to Release Data in Easy-to-Read, Digital Formats” National Post (24
December 2014), online: <news.nationalpost.com/2014/12/24/information-czar-investigating-whether-government-refusing-to-release-data-in-easy-to-read-digital-formats>.
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because of the risk that it would be manipulated and perhaps used to spread false
information.151 The discussion that arose focused mainly on the use of
technological barriers to prevent falsification of data instead of to protect
against reidentification.152 Based on this focus, some took issue with the
government taking steps to obstruct use of the data, arguing that the information
should be released in reusable format and false information simply rebutted. 153
While this approach may balance the public’s right to access information with
the risk that information will be used to spread false or misleading claims, it does
not address the personal privacy concerns. As noted above, however,
technological barriers might do no more than merely impose a delay to misuse
where there is a high motivation to manipulate the data in a way that might
reidentify individuals.154 At the same time, they may inhibit innovative and
valuable uses of the data.
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Dean Beeby, ‘‘Tony Clement Concern about Electronic Information Access Queried:
Bureaucrats Query Treasury Board President’s Claim that Datasets Must Be Protected
from Manipulation” CBC News (8 March 2015), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
tony-clement-concern-about-electronic-information-access-queried-1.2983561>.
Though this section considers the issue that arose following the Treasury Board
President’s comments in terms of the privacy risks of cross-referencing different data
sets, it is important to emphasize that his comments concerning the cross-referencing of
information for secondary purposes in a way that produces false information presents an
important question for researchers to consider. The Committee on Strategies for
Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial Data emphasizes that in order for data to be usable,
it must be accompanied by specifications about the meaning of the data. Where data are
being pulled from different sources (e.g., different databases), the meaning of the data
must be compatible in order to avoid producing false information when combined:
Committee on Strategies for Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial Data, supra note 21 at
132.
Beeby, supra note 152; Press, supra note 151.
Beeby, supra note 152.
This was emphasized following the comments made by Tony Clement through media
comments about the fact that recipients of the data were unhappy because the move
‘‘ha[d] meant extra time for researchers or journalists making the request to transfer data
into easy-to-handle forms to identify trends or issues”: Press, supra note 151. Similarly, in
the context of personal health information obtained in clinical trials, the Committee on
Strategies for Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial Data notes that:
[P]roponents of open access believe that individuals and organizations with bad
intentions could easily find ways to overcome the controls instituted by sponsors,
and the controls would therefore serve only to slow the rate of scientific discovery
and advancement without mitigating risks.
Committee on Strategies for Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial Data, supra note 21
at 141.
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IV. A DECISION-MAKING MODEL FOR RELEASING OPEN
GOVERNMENT DATA
The main steps involved in assessing information available for proactive
release of government information are compiled below in a decision-making tree.
The guide highlights the relevant questions to be asked when considering whether
or not to release a given data set or other types of information as well as the
options that may be considered where a particular privacy risk is identified.

(a) Decision-Making Tree for the Release of Government-Held Information

As indicated in the guide and in the discussion above, the first question to
ask is whether the information being considered for proactive release is personal
information. If it is clearly not, the choices are to release the information in full
or to withhold the data. As previously noted, the goals of the open government
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movement support disclosure in such circumstances unless a specific legislative
exception applies. If the information is or may be personal information, the
questions set out in Table 1 above should be asked to clarify the purpose of
disclosure and the privacy risks related to the specific data set at hand. Following
this, the options depend on whether the information is publicly available
personal information. If the information is not publicly available personal
information, it may only be released in anonymized form. If the information is
anonymized for release, the strength of the anonymization technique should be
tested from the perspective of a motivated intruder and an individual with some
knowledge of those whose personal information is in the data set. If this process
confirms that the information has been anonymized, the data may be released.
Licence restrictions or technological barriers may be used if the previous
assessment has highlighted a particular privacy risk. If the information is publicly
available personal information, data custodians must consider the potential
privacy issues relevant to the online disclosure of this type of personal
information (including that the information becomes easier to access,
disseminate, and cross-reference with purportedly anonymized data). These
issues may be partially addressed through the use of licence restrictions and
technological barriers to reuse of the information. It may also be deemed
appropriate in certain cases to withhold publicly available personal information
from online release where the transparency value of the information is low but
the privacy risk high, or where there is only a temporary need for the public to
have access to the information. Moreover, the information may not be available
for release as open data due to conflict between the goals of open data and
certain parts of privacy and personal data protection legislation. If publicly
available personal information is released online, licence restrictions can be used
to refine the continued application of this area of the law.

(b) Assessing the Proportionality of Restrictions Used
Based on the above, data custodians may decide to use anonymization
techniques, licence restrictions, or technological barriers (alone or in
combination), or to withhold information from online disclosure or even any
form of public disclosure. As a final best practice, we offer a series of questions
that can be used to evaluate the proportionality of the restrictions used in Table
3, below.

STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY IN OPEN DATA

259

(i) Table 3: Evaluating Restrictions Used
Question155

Notes

1. Are the restrictions necessary to Refer to privacy risk identified as part of the
prevent a specific privacy risk related inquiry outlined in Table 1, above.
to the release of the information?
2. Are the restrictions designed to
minimally impair the benefits of
disclosure?

Consider purpose of disclosure identified as
part of the inquiry outlined in Table 1,
above; consider whether the information is
available through another means (e.g.,
publicly available personal information
contained in a registry) that provides an
alternate means to fulfill the purpose for
disclosure.

3. Do the benefits of the restrictions
outweigh any adverse effects attached to the modified release or
withholding of the information?

V. CONCLUSION
This paper has aimed to outline strategies for those responsible for the
release of information in the open government context. These strategies are
intended to assist in complying with the legislated requirement to balance
transparency with privacy in the release of government information. As we have
discussed, such decisions are complicated by several factors, including:
i. continuing questions about how to apply the definition of personal
information;
ii. a rapidly changing information environment in which the amount of
information is increasing while information technologies progress; and
iii. the fact that anonymization techniques are proving to be less reliable than
previously believed.
In order to guide the decision-making process, we have suggested a series of
questions to ask in evaluating the privacy risk and transparency value relating to
the release of specific data sets and other types of information being
contemplated for disclosure. Where this process reveals a particular privacy
risk, decision-makers will need to consider options for minimizing the risks
before disclosing information to the public. These options include licence
restrictions as well as technological barriers to reuse of the information. The
155

These questions have been modeled in part on the proportionality test outlined in Austin
& Pelletier, supra note 71 at 13 (provided to assess restrictions on access to court
documents).
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steps to decision-making and some proposed solutions have been presented in a
decision-making tree that can be used in the assessment of individual data sets.
As a final step, data custodians should evaluate the proportionality of any
restrictions on access to government-held information in order to ensure that the
focus remains on balancing the goals of open government and open data with the
risks to personal privacy that attach to the emerging open government
environment.

VI. GLOSSARY
Aggregation: the displaying of statistical data as totals, averages or in ranges,
with personal identifiers removed.156
Anonymization (or de-identification): a process through which data are freed of
personal identifiers and that is unlikely to allow reidentification of any individual
when combined with other information sources.157
Big data: the massive and increasing amount of data available in digital form. 158
Data minimization: policy relating to the collection of information by
government actors, which emphasizes non-identifiable interactions as a starting
point in order to minimize the amount of personal information that is collected
by the public sector.159
Motivated intruder test: an approach to evaluating the strength of
anonymization techniques which assumes the position of a person who holds
no prior knowledge of the personal details within the data and who wants to
reidentify one or more individuals by combining the information with outside
sources of data.160
Open access: a concept linked to the ‘‘right to information” movement and the
availability of government-held information, especially information relating to
government operations.161
Open data: the release of data in reusable electronic formats under an open
licence for reuse.162
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157

158
159
160
161
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ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 52; Fraser & Willison, supra note 103 at 2.
ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 6; El Emam et al, supra note 112 at 1 defining deidentification as ‘‘the act of reducing the information content in data to decrease the
probability of discovering an individual’s identity.”
Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Open Government.” supra note 6 at 407.
Cavoukian ‘‘Privacy and Government 2.0,” supra note 84 at 10.
ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 22.
Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Open Government,” supra note 6 at 399; TBS, ‘‘Action Plan,” supra
note 15.
Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Open Government,” supra note 6 at 399.
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Open dialogue: a two-way conversation between Canada’s different governments
and their people that aims for better public engagement in the delivery of public
policies and programs.163
Open engagement: activities involving both the government and its public, which
may include citizen participation in government activities and decision-making
through mechanisms such as social media or online reporting of community
issues that relate to government responsibilities. 164
Open government: movement aiming to increase transparency and
accountability in the public sector and to promote the economic value of data
through open access, open data, and open engagement.165
Personal information: information about an identifiable individual. 166
Privacy impact assessment: a process that aims to determine how a government
program or service will impact individual privacy and to highlight ways to
minimize that impact.167
Proactive disclosure: release of information to the public without any specific
requirement to disclose the information (e.g., in response to an access to
information request).168
Pseudonymization: a de-identification technique that replaces ‘‘real world”
identities with a pseudonym that allows users to associate the data with the
pseudonym but not the real personal identity.169
Publicly available personal information: information about one or more
individuals that is openly available to the public for consultation. 170
Re-identification: the process of data-matching, cross-referencing or otherwise
analyzing purportedly anonymized data to identify one or more individuals from
within a data set.171
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TBS, ‘‘Action Plan,” supra note 15.
Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Open Government,” supra note 6 at 400.
Ibid at 398.
See above discussion on personal information in the access to information context in
Canada.
CRA, ‘‘PIAs,” supra note 90; TBS, Privacy Impact Assessment Guidelines, supra note
90.
Denham, ‘‘BC Ferries,” supra note 9 at 2.
ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 49, 51.
Scassa, ‘‘Privacy and Publicly Available Personal Information,” supra note 68 at 10.
See a similar definition in ICO, Anonymisation, supra note 38 at 6, 49.
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Secondary purpose: any use of data beyond that for which it was collected,
including for analysis, research, safety and quality measurement and
improvement, and marketing.172
Transparency: a concept given variable definitions in different contexts,
including: the act of ‘‘making relevant, timely and useful information available
to the public in easy to access formats,”173 or
[A] measure of the degree to which the existence, content, or meaning of a law,
regulation, action, process, or condition is ascertainable or understandable by a
party with reason to be interested in that law, regulation, action, process, or
condition.174
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El Emam & Fineberg, supra note 85 at 2; El Emam et al, supra note 112 at 1.
Health Canada, ‘‘Posting Information,” supra note 5.
Mock, supra note 5 at 1082 [emphasis omitted].

